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Institutional Change in the Banking Union:
The Case of the Single Supervisory
Mechanism
Pierre Schammo*
Abstract: This article is about institutional change in the Banking Union. It has
two related aims. The first is to engage with the law of the Single Supervisory
Mechanism (SSM)—the first pillar of the Banking Union—and in this context to
discuss tensions that have lately emerged between the case law of the Court of
Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and that of the German Federal
Constitutional Court. The second, but main, aim of this article is to put the law of
the SSM as it was enacted in the SSM Regulation, and as it was interpreted by the
CJEU and by the German court, in a broader perspective of institutional change.
For this purpose, this article adopts an interdisciplinary approach that seeks insights
on institutional change in the political science literature. In particular, the article
seeks to shed light on the role played by courts. In short, it argues that whilst the
SSM is a story of change following an exogenous shock (ie the sovereign debt cri-
sis), it is also an account of change and contestation between courts made possible
by the ambiguities and incompleteness of the SSM rules. It will show that the evo-
lution of the SSM is by no means frictionless and that it is only by tracing change
from the point of the enactment of the law to its interpretation by the courts that
one gains a real appreciation of the dynamics and salience of change within
the SSM.
I. Introduction
This article is about institutional change in the Banking Union. It pursues two
aims. The first is to engage with the law of the Single Supervisory Mechanism
(SSM)—the first pillar of the Banking Union. The SSM is about bank
supervision and was established following the Eurozone crisis (or sovereign
debt crisis). It has the European Central Bank (ECB) at its heart. The latter
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was vested with bank supervisory tasks under a Council Regulation (the SSM
Regulation),1 which it carries out together with supervisory authorities of
Member States that participate in the Banking Union (hereinafter, national
competent authorities or NCAs). This article discusses the law of the SSM. In
this context, it also examines tensions that have lately emerged between the
case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and that of the
German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht or BVerfG)
following the latter’s judgment on the Banking Union.2 In short, it will show
that the CJEU and the BVerfG do not agree on a basic question of competence
in the SSM, that is, essentially whether NCAs, when carrying out supervisory
tasks in relation to smaller credit institutions (so-called ‘less significant’ credit
institutions) under the SSM Regulation, do so on the basis of their pre-existing
national competence.
The second, but main, aim of this article is to put the law of the SSM as it was
enacted in the SSM Regulation, and as it was interpreted by the CJEU and the
BVerfG, in a broader perspective of institutional change. Hence, my interest in
institutional change frames the approach that this article adopts. Specifically, the
article grapples with several themes that have shaped debates on institutional
change in the literature: how institutional arrangements change over time; what
common mechanisms there are through which change occurs; what common fac-
tors act as triggers for change; and which actors participate in shaping change. To
contribute to debates on institutional change, this article takes a cross-disciplin-
ary approach and seeks insights on institutional change in the political science lit-
erature. The Eurozone crisis and the changes which ensued, have offered legal
scholarship and scholarship in political science valuable material. Yet, despite
being a theme of common interest, cross-fertilization between scholarship has
been limited. This is unfortunate since disciplines such as law and political sci-
ence have much to learn from each other. Indeed, a cross-disciplinary approach is
arguably especially promising when what is at issue is the evolution of formal
‘institutions’ (that is for our purposes, written law).3 In trying to understand and
conceptualize the related dynamics, political science offers concepts and theories
1 Council Regulation (EU) No 1024/2013 of 15 October 2013 conferring specific tasks on the
European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institu-
tions [2013] OJ L287/63.
2 BVerfG, Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 30. Juli 2019—2 BvR 1685/14, http://www.bverfg.de/e/
rs20190730_2bvr168514.html. An English translation is available here: https://www.bundesverfas
sungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/EN/2019/07/rs20190730_2bvr168514en.html.
Note, however, that some key paragraphs (especially, paras 188–196) were not translated into
English.
3 It is important to note that the meaning of ‘institutions’ in the literature on institutional change
contrasts markedly with the way in which legal scholarship typically understands the term (that is,
as organizations or as EU institutions, for example). The understanding of institutions in the insti-
tutional literature that resonates best with legal scholarship is that of written rules. However, note
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to account for change. Legal scholarship meanwhile offers the necessary under-
standing of the law, as well as its ambiguities and incompleteness.
To be sure, even if cross-fertilization between disciplines has been limited, the
literature on the Eurozone crisis is voluminous. In political science, contributions
have looked at the crisis from various theoretical angles: for example liberal inter-
governmentalism, neo-functionalism, or new institutionalism, such as historical
institutionalism.4 Much has also been written in the legal literature, with authors
seeking to draw lessons from a judicial and/or constitutional/administrative law
perspective.5 A theme of interest in both disciplines has been how best to account
for institutional changes that have taken place in response to the Eurozone crisis.
In the political science literature, this work fits with a long held interest in seeking
to explain and account for institutional change. In the legal literature too, the
Eurozone crisis has prompted assessments of patterns of change (eg in terms of a
‘constitutional mutation’6). Whilst naturally the emphasis is more on the sub-
stance of the law, assessments have led to contrasting conclusions with respect to
the salience of these changes.7
That said, the above literature has comparatively less to say on two important
aspects. The first concerns a key response to the crisis: that is, the Banking Union
and, given our area of interest, the Single Supervisory Mechanism. Here sector spe-
cific literature has more to say.8 In law, this literature typically engages with the
4 See eg F Schimmelfennig, ‘Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis’ (2015) 22
Journal of European Public Policy, 177–95; A Niemann and D Ioannou, ‘European economic inte-
gration in times of crisis: a case of neofunctionalism?’ (2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy,
196–218; A Verdun, ‘A historical institutionalist explanation of the EU’s responses to the euro area
financial crisis’ (2015) 22 Journal of European Public Policy 219–37; E Jones, R Kelemen, and S
Meunier, ‘Failing forward? The euro crisis and the incomplete nature of European integration’
(2016) 49 Comparative Political Studies, 1010–34.
5 The literature is far too voluminous to be captured in a footnote. For examples, see M Dawson
and F de Witte, ‘Constitutional balance in the EU after the euro-crisis’ (2013) 76 Modern Law
Review, 817–44; E Chiti and P Gustavo Teixeira, ‘The constitutional implications of the European
responses to the financial and public debt crisis’ (2013) 50 CML Rev, 683–708; F Fabbrini, ‘The
euro-crisis and the courts: judicial review and the political process in comparative perspective’
(2014) 32 Berkeley Journal of International Law, 64–123; K Tuori and K Tuori, The Eurozone
Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); A José
Menendez, ‘Editorial: a European Union in constitutional mutation?’ (2014) 20 European Law
Journal, 127–41; B de Witte, ‘Euro crisis responses and the EU legal order: increased institutional
variation or constitutional mutation’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review, 434–57; A
Hinarejos, The Euro Area Crisis in Constitutional Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2015); M Ioannidis, ‘Europe’s new transformations: how the EU economic constitution changed
during the eurozone crisis’ (2016) 53 CML Rev, 1237–82; T Beukers, B de Witte, and C
Kilpatrick (eds), Constitutional Change through Euro-Crisis Law (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017).
6 Eg Tuori and Tuori (n 5).
7 See eg de Witte (n 5) who takes issue with the ‘constitutional mutation’ claim(s).
8 See eg E Ferran and V Babis, ‘The European Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (2013) 13 Journal of
Corporate Law Studies, 255–85; E Wymeersch, ‘The Single Supervisory Mechanism or “SSM”,
Part one of the Banking Union’ (ECGI Law Working Paper No. 240/2014, February 2014), avail-
able at <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id¼2397800>; K Alexander, ‘The
ECB and banking supervision: building effective prudential supervision?’ (2014) 33 YEL, 417–32;
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complexities and intricacies of the law itself.9 However, the level of theorizing when
accounting for change does vary. The second aspect concerns the evolution of the
arrangements that were put in place in order to deal with the Eurozone crisis. A vo-
luminous literature has focused on the EU’s more immediate response to the crisis.
Comparatively less attention has been given to the continuous evolution of these
arrangements and what it tells us about institutional change. In this context, the role
played by courts has also attracted less attention.10 In particular, the judgment of the
BVerfG on the Banking Union and its importance from an institutional change per-
spective remain under-appreciated.11 By taking an inter-disciplinary approach and
engaging with the law of the SSM and its interpretation by the courts, this article
works towards addressing this gap. My basic contention is that whilst the SSM is a
story of change following an exogenous shock (ie the sovereign debt crisis), shedding
light on judicial decision-making demonstrates that the SSM is also an account of
change and contestation between courts, made possible by the ambiguities and in-
completeness of the SSM rules. Hence, I will show that the evolution of the SSM is
by no means frictionless and that it is only by tracing change from the point of the
enactment of the law to its interpretation by the courts that one gains a real appreci-
ation of the dynamics and salience of change within the SSM.
This article proceeds as follows. Section II begins by examining the literature
on institutional change and identifies a number of takeaways that will inform the
subsequent discussion. Section III turns to the SSM Regulation in order to gain
first insights on institutional change within the SSM. This section also seeks to
T Tuominen, ‘The European Banking Union: a shift in the internal market paradigm?’ (2017) 54
CML Rev, 1359–80; G Lo Schiavo, The European Banking Union and the Role of the Law
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019); S Grundmann and H-W Micklitz (eds), The European
Banking Union and Constitution—Beacon for Advanced Integration or Death-Knell for Democracy
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019). In the political science literature, see eg F Schimmelfennig, ‘A
differentiated leap forward: spillover, path-dependency, and graded membership in European
banking regulation’ (2016) 39 West European Politics, 483–502; R Epstein and M Rhodes, ‘The
political dynamics behind Europe’s new banking union’ (2016) 39 West European Politics, 415–37;
D Howarth and L Quaglia, The Political Economy of European Banking Union (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2016).
9 That said, contributions on the theme of change, continuity, or discontinuity are not entirely ab-
sent in this literature See eg P Gustavo Teixeira, ‘The legal history of the Banking Union’ (2017)
18 European Business Organization Law Review, 535–65.
10 For an exception that highlights the role of the CJEU, see A Türk, ‘European Banking Union
and its relations with European Union institutions’ in M Chiti and V Santoro (eds), The Palgrave
Handbook of European Banking Union Law (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), 41–64, 58–61.
11 For first contributions, M Gentzsch and A Brade, ‘Die Bankenunion vor dem
Bundesverfassungsgericht—Neue Impulse für grundlegende Fragestellungen des Verfassungs- und
Unionsrechts’ (2019) 54 Europarecht, 602–63; P Schammo “Matching or clashing?
‘Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v ECB’ and the decision of the German
Bundesverfassungsgericht on the Banking Union” (Oxford Business Law Blog, 17 January 2020),
available at <https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2020/01/matching-or-clashing-
landeskreditbank-baden-wurttemberg-v-ecb-and>; M Ludwigs, T Pascher, and P Sikora, ‘Das
Bankenunion-Urteil als judikativer Kraftakt des BVerfG—Detailanalyse von SSM und SRM im
Karlsruher Alleingang’ (2020) 2 Europäisches Wirtschafts- und Steuerrecht, 85–93; P Faraguna and
D Messineo, ‘Light and shadows in the Bundesverfassungsgericht’s decision upholding the
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prepare the ground for examining, in Section IV, the role of courts in shaping
change in the SSM. Specifically, Section IV focuses on two key judicial deci-
sions—the CJEU’s decision(s) in Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v ECB
and the judgment of the BVerfG on the Banking Union.12 It examines the contra-
dictions between the findings of the CJEU and the BVerfG and demonstrates
how each of these decisions contributes to the institutional change problematic.
Section V summarizes the main lessons learned and reflects on the prospect of
reconciliation between courts. Section VI concludes.
II. Institutional change: analytical background
As noted, this article seeks to assess institutional change in the SSM. This section
takes the first steps towards this aim. It begins by introducing some of the litera-
ture on institutional change (Section II.A), and identifies the main takeaways for
the subsequent analysis of the SSM (Section II.B).
A. The literature on institutional change
The literature on institutional change seeks to study and conceptualize change in
relation to ‘institutions’—a vague term that, depending on the theoretical lens,
can be understood in diverse, more or less broad, ways. The understanding of
institutions that resonates best with legal scholarship is that of formal rules.13
Accordingly, this is the understanding of ‘institutions’ that I will adopt in this art-
icle. This sub-section reviews, for insight and inspiration, some of the literature
on institutional change. There are at least three basic insights that can be gained
from this literature. The first of these insights is about the dynamics and salience
of change. To put it simply, institutional change can be more or less dramatic. It
can come about suddenly or happen slowly over time. It can be either exogenous-
ly driven (eg as a result of an economic crisis)14 or endogenously driven, that is
12 BVerfG (n 2) above; Case T-122/15, Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg—Förderbank v
European Central Bank ECLI:EU:T:2017:337; Case C-450/17 P, Landeskreditbank Baden-
Württemberg—Förderbank v European Central Bank ECLI:EU:C:2019:372.
13 As noted earlier (see (n 3)), the meaning of ‘institutions’ in the literature on institutional change
contrasts markedly with the way in which legal scholarship typically understands the term (that is,
as organizations or as EU institutions, for example). The understanding of ‘institutions’ that is
adopted here is closest to rational choice or historical institutionalist approaches. On the different
meaning of institutions, see J Campbell, Institutional Change and Globalization (Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press, 2004) 3–4.
14 See eg ibid 174 (describing exogenous factors as including ‘war, economic catastrophe, and other
calamities as well as abrupt shifts in prices and transaction costs, changes in state policy, dramatic
technological innovations, and the like’). Of course, the transition from problem (whether en-
dogenous or exogeneous) to solution cannot be taken for granted. Campbell, for example, high-
lights a number of issues that might stand in the way of institutional change, such as actors failing
to identify a problem; actors disagreeing on whether or how to address it; or actors deciding to ad-
dress a problem without that this involves changing institutions (ibid 175).
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‘from within the workings of the institutions, rather than outside’.15 Two models
proved initially popular in order to conceptualize change: an evolutionary model
where change ‘proceeds in small, incremental steps along a single path in a certain
direction’,16 and a punctuated equilibrium model where long periods of path-de-
pendent stability are punctuated by brief periods of radical change during so-
called ‘critical junctures’.17 These models proved popular in legal scholarship too.
Grundfest, for example, described the development of US securities regulation as
consistent with the logic of punctuated equilibria.18 However, the usefulness of
thinking about change in such strictly dichotomous terms has been questioned in
the more recent past. Streeck and Thelen, for example, argue against being too
deterministic. These authors seek to disentangle processes of change, which can
be incremental or abrupt, from the outcomes of change, which can represent
continuity or discontinuity.19 In the process, they argue against a ‘conceptual
schema’ that only allows for ‘either incremental change supporting institutional
continuity through reproductive adaptation, or disruptive change causing institu-
tional breakdown and innovation and thereby resulting in discontinuity’.20
Campbell too, is critical of a rigid conceptualization. For Campbell, institutional
change is not a ‘dichotomous variable’. Instead, it should be situated on a con-
tinuum: ‘it is a matter of degree and needs to be examined as such’.21
Besides this point about the nature and dynamics of change, Campbell’s work
offers two additional insights, which are more methodological, but which are
critical for the discussion that follows.22 The first is about the importance of pre-
cisely identifying what one seeks to track when accounting for change; the second
is about the timeframe over which one seeks to track change.23 Starting with the
former, Campbell notes that to accurately account for change, one needs first to
identify the dimensions of an ‘institution’ that matter. Typically, this question
will be influenced by the theoretical perspective that one adopts.24 This goes
15 M Pollack, ‘Rational choice and historical institutionalism’ in A Wiener, T Börzel, and T Risse
(eds), European Integration Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) 108–27, 113.
16 Campbell (n 13), 33.
17 See G Capoccia and R Kelemen, ‘The study of critical junctures: theory, narrative, and counter-
factuals in historical institutionalism’ (2007) 59 World Politics, 341–69. See also J Mahoney and K
Thelen, ‘A theory of gradual institutional change’ in J Mahoney and K Thelen (eds), Explaining
Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010),
1–37, 7 describing critical junctures as ‘periods of contingency during which the usual constraints
on action are lifted or eased’ (reference omitted).
18 See J Grundfest, ‘Punctuated equilibria in the evolution of United States securities regulation’
(2002) 8 Stanford Journal of Law, Business & Finance, 1–8, 1.
19 W Streeck and K Thelen, ‘Introduction: institutional change in advanced political economies’ in
W Streeck and K Thelen (eds), Beyond Continuity—Institutional Change in Advanced Political
Economies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 1–39, 8.
20 Ibid 8.
21 Campbell (n 13), 58.
22 See also Campbell who notes with respect to these insights that they ‘can yield important theor-
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back to the point that political scientists and sociologists working on institutional
analysis see the world through different ‘lenses’ (eg rational choice, historical, or
sociological institutionalism) and their understanding of institutions varies ac-
cordingly.25 As a result, they might seek to track change in formal written rules,
informal rules or, say, cultural/cognitive frames. Nevertheless, the dimensions
that one choses to examine must be ‘salient’. As Campbell puts it, the ‘danger is
that researchers may confuse dimensions that are relevant to themselves with
those that are salient to the actors they are studying’.26
The second point is about the importance of ‘time’: change that appears small
or radical at the stage of institutional creation might require an altogether differ-
ent characterization if one extends the timeframe for analysis to the implementa-
tion or application stage of rules. This stage, ‘carries its own dynamic of potential
change’,27 say for example, because of contestation before a court or because of
the way in which ambiguous rules are applied—or not applied—later on. Thus,
‘avoiding one-shot game explanations’28 by tracking changes over an appropriate
timeframe can yield important insights.
The importance of selecting the right timeframe is apparent in several major
works.29 It is, for example, an important consideration in Farrell’s and Héritier’s
work on interstitial institutional change,30 which Bruno de Witte draws upon in
his assessment of constitutional change in the wake of the Eurozone crisis.31
Specifically, Farrell’s and Héritier’s work highlights the importance of examining
the periods in between formal Treaty changes when accounting for change. They
posit that Treaty ambiguities will offer opportunities to policy actors to maximize
their competences in the periods in between Treaty change. Thus, interstitial in-
stitutional change is defined as ‘change in institutions which occurs between
Treaty reforms’.32 What is more, they posit the existence of a sort of feedback
loop: interstitial institutional changes may ‘[feed] back into processes of Treaty
change’.33 ‘Time’ is also a key consideration in Mahoney’s and Thelen’s work on
gradual institutional change.34 The authors observe that institutional change
based on endogenous developments that take place after the point of institutional
creation are often ‘overlook[ed]’ by the literature because they require one to
‘consider a somewhat longer time frame than is characteristic in much of the
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid 37.
27 Mahoney and Thelen (n 17), 10.
28 L Soriano, ‘Vertical juridical disputes over legal bases’ (2007) 30 West European Politics, 321–37,
322.
29 ‘Time’ is also of course crucial in Campbell’s analysis (see Campbell (n 13), 41–7).
30 H Farrell and A Héritier, ‘Introduction: contested competences in the European Union’ (2007)
30 West European Politics, 227–43.
31 de Witte, (n 7).
32 Farrell and Héritier (n 30), 232.
33 Ibid.
34 Mahoney and Thelen (n 17), 2.
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literature’.35 For the authors, institutions typically have ‘power-distributional
implications’36 and actors, who benefit unevenly from the establishment of insti-
tutional arrangements, will as a result have differing interests to defend or contest
these arrangements subsequently. Mahoney and Thelen go on to identify several
mechanisms through which institutions may evolve over time.37 They coin them
‘displacement’, ‘drift’, ‘layering’, and ‘conversion’. Each mechanism or ‘mode of
institutional change’ is presented as having different features and as describing a
different logic of change.38 Displacement, for example, refers to the ‘removal of
existing rules and the introduction of new ones’, a process which according to
Mahoney and Thelen can be abrupt/radical, but also ‘slow moving’.39 This may
be so when actors who lost out under existing institutional arrangements are able
to introduce new institutions which enter into competition with existing ones
and which come to gradually eclipse the latter.40 Drift refers to the situation
where rules are left unchanged in the face of environmental shifts and this in-
action causes the impact of the rules to change.41 Layering and conversion are le-
gally speaking more complex modes. Layering refers to the ‘introduction of new
rules on top of or alongside existing ones’.42 According to the authors, examples
of layering are common in situations where existing arrangements cannot be
challenged, for example because of the presence of veto players.43 Mahoney and
Thelen claim that in such a case, adding a new institutional layer (eg new rules)
on top of, or alongside, existing arrangements may be the way forward and still
bring about ‘substantial change’ if the former is able to destabilize the latter.44
Meanwhile conversion takes place where existing rules are interpreted in new and
contrasting ways, allowing ‘institutions’—in our context formal rules—to be
redirected to ‘new goals, functions, or purposes’45 by actors who deliberately take
advantage of the ‘inherent ambiguities of the institutions’.46 To be sure, the law
cannot be interpreted at will. Most obviously, a rule cannot be interpreted in a
way that plainly contradicts its wording. However, when seeking to ascertain the
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid 14. See also ibid 8 referring to institutions as ‘distributional instruments laden with power
implications’.
37 Ibid 15–16. See also the earlier work of Streeck and Thelen (n 19).
38 These modes have proven very influential in the political science literature. For an application,
see eg M Salines, G Glöcker, and Y Truchlewski, ‘Existential crisis, incremental response: the euro-
zone’s dual institutional evolution 2007–2011’ (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy, 665–
81.
39 Mahoney and Thelen (n 17), 16.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid 17. Thus, according to Mahoney and Thelen, actors who oppose the rules may seek to ex-
ploit this state of affairs.
42 Ibid 15.
43 Ibid 19.
44 Ibid 17, noting that ‘layering can, however, bring substantial change if amendments alter the
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meaning or scope of a rule, there is often significant room to operate within the
boundaries set by the wording of the rules. Indeed, for Mahoney and Thelen,
change by ‘conversion’ is possible because of the ambiguity of rules.47 Hence,
they argue that incremental change often happens at the stage of the interpret-
ation and enforcement of rules, emerging ‘in the “gaps” or “soft spots” between
the rule and its interpretation or the rule and its enforcement’.48 Such ‘gaps’ may
accordingly become contestation ‘sites’ over ‘the form, functions, and salience of
specific institutions . . .’.49
B. Analytical takeaways
The above literature provides useful insights. It draws our attention to the different dy-
namics and salience of institutional change, but also warns us against being too deter-
ministic when seeking to conceptualize change. It encourages us to be more explicit
about the institutional dimensions that are relevant to ascertain the reality of change.
Importantly, it alerts us to the importance of the timeframe when tracking change and
draws our attention to the fact that whilst change can be a response to a problem that
has an exogeneous cause (eg an economic crisis), it can also have as origin endogenous
problems that emerge after the point of institutional creation. Finally, it invites us to
examine the mechanisms (conversion, layering, drift, etc) by which institutions can
change over time. Building on these insights, this subsection identifies three key take-
aways that will inform the subsequent discussion on institutional change in the SSM.
1. Change and legal ambiguity/incompleteness
The message of Mahoney and Thelen on how legal ambiguities or ‘gaps’ in for-
mal rules offer opportunities to shape ‘institutions’ over time is likely to resonate
with legal scholarship.50 Hereinafter, I will draw on the work of Mahoney and
Thelen. I will proceed on the basis that legal ambiguities and legal incomplete-
ness can serve as an intellectual and interpretative ‘battle ground’ where contests
over the precise meaning and function of rules can take place, and where as a re-
sult institutional change can occur over time. The point has arguably special rele-
vance in a context such as the EU where the law can often be vague and
ambiguous. That is true of the Treaties, as Farrell and Héritier point out in their
analysis of interstitial institutional change.51 But it is also true of secondary legis-
lation. There is a multitude of reasons for this state of affairs. It might be because
of bounded rationality or imperfect information, or simply because it is the price
to pay for reaching agreement over a piece of legislation. To conceptualize
change, the institutional modes that Thelen and others identify help to gain
47 Ibid 21. See also ibid 27.
48 Ibid 14.
49 Streeck and Thelen (n 19), 19.
50 Mahoney and Thelen (n 17).
51 See (n 30).
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ground. Recall that among these modes, ‘conversion’ describes how actors can at-
tempt to take advantage of the ‘inherent ambiguities of the institutions’52 in
order to redirect rules, by way of interpretation, to new outcomes. Hereinafter,
these modes of institutional change will prove useful when considering the role
of the courts in the evolution of the SSM. That said, when considering their use-
fulness, it is also worth bearing in mind that they are ‘ideal types’ in a Weberian
sense.53 They are conceptual tools that can help to make sense of a more complex
reality. But they do not exhaust the ways in which institutions can change.54
Moreover, to explain change, it may well be necessary to combine the distinct
insights offered by different modes of institutional change. Thus, for example, in
cases where new rules were added on top of existing ones (as described in the
layering mode), the impact that the former have on the latter may be unclear and
may accordingly need to be ‘discovered’ through interpretation, opening up the
prospect of change through ‘conversion’. Indeed, one might go a step further. If
ambiguity is, as Mahoney and Thelen contend, something that is a ‘permanent
feature’ of rules,55 one might posit that it may well be unclear whether rules were
merely layered on top of, or alongside, existing ones, or whether their impact is
more dramatic, such as where they effectively replace existing ones. Under these
circumstances, the outcomes to which rules can be directed and redirected, as
described in the conversion mode, may well depend on whether the adoption of
new rules is found to be consistent either with the sort of layering of rules that is
characteristic of the layering mode, or with something else, such as a replacement
of rules. I will return to the point later when considering the role of the courts in
our account of institutional change. For the moment, it is sufficient to add that
this issue does not arise in Thelen’s conceptualization of modes of institutional
change. However, questions about how rules interact with each other are arguably
common in a two-level system such as the EU where regulatory activity takes
place at both the national level and the EU level.56 Indeed, ambiguity with re-
spect to, say, the meaning or scope of EU rules may often be intended in order to
52 Mahoney and Thelen (n 17) 17.
53 I am very grateful to Kathleen Thelen for pointing this out to me. Max Weber developed the
concept of ‘ideal types’, describing it as an ‘analytical accentuation . . . of certain elements of reality’
(quoted in R Swedberg, The Max Weber Dictionary: Key Words and Central Concepts (Stanford, CA:
Stanford University Press, 2005), 119). The basic thinking is that, when trying to explain a com-
plex reality, it can be useful to start with ‘what is essential about a phenomenon’. Ideal types are
meant to serve this purpose. See ibid 120.
54 For an example where the institutional modes were found not to fit and for a proposal to add a
new mode (coined ‘copying’) to those identified above, see A Verdun, ‘A historical institutionalist
explanation of the EU’s responses to the euro area financial crisis’ (2015) 22 Journal of European
Public Policy, 219–37, 232.
55 Mahoney and Thelen (n 17), 11.
56 Admittedly, EU rules benefit from primacy, but before national rules can be set aside, it might
be necessary to first ascertain whether national rules are impacted by EU rules. This in turn may re-
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find political agreement at EU level. In such a case, the precise meaning or scope
of EU rules may well ultimately have to be ascertained before the judiciary.
2. Contestation between courts
Hereinafter, I will examine how ambiguous and incomplete provisions of the
Treaties and the SSM Regulation opened an interpretative space for the CJEU
and the BVerfG to reach markedly contrasting findings on the SSM, and how as a
result these courts were able to either amplify or contest institutional change
within the SSM. Hence, in this article, I will conceive of courts as actors of
change, which whilst relying on legal discourse, can shape outcomes by resolving
ambiguities and incompleteness in formal written rules.
To be sure, contestation over the meaning and purpose of rules should find an
easy resolution in an EU context. Under the preliminary reference procedure, it
is the CJEU which has the final word on the interpretation and the validity of
EU law.57 Assessments of the facts of the case, as well as the need for a prelimin-
ary ruling in order to allow a national court to deliver judgment, are matters for
national courts.58 The relationship between courts is supposed to be based on co-
operation and a distribution of functions. On the whole, the preliminary refer-
ence procedure has allowed the CJEU to become a very effective pro-
integrationist ‘change actor’.59 Nevertheless, the CJEU is not ‘at the apex of an
integrated judicial hierarchy’60 and the CJEU’s pro-active role in promoting inte-
gration has not been without causing strains in its relations with national courts
wary of seeing the CJEU’s integrationist case law encroaching on the autonomy
of national legal orders and national institutions.61 The literature identifies
57 Art. 267 TFEU. There is no need here to go into the detail of the separation of functions be-
tween EU and national courts. The only precision worth adding is that whilst national courts are
prevented from ruling that an EU act is invalid, they are not prevented from ruling that it is valid.
See Case 314/85 Foto-Frost v Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost ECLI:EU:C:1987:452, paras 14–15.
58 See eg Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and others ECLI:EU:C:2015:400, para. 15.
59 Note that the role of the European Court as pro-integrationist actor of change has long been rec-
ognized. However, this is not to say that the CJEU is necessarily unresponsive to pressures from
the national level when salient issues are involved. See M Pollack, ‘The new EU legal history:
what’s new, what’s missing?’ (2013) 28 American University International Law Review, 1257–310
who offers a fuller view. See also M Blauberger and S Schmidt, ‘The European Court of Justice
and its political impact’ (2017) 40 West European Politics, 907–18, 909 noting that ‘the Court is
more restrained than previously acknowledged when faced with stronger member state opposition’.
See also O Larsson and D Naurin, ‘Judicial independence and political uncertainty: how the risk of
override affects the Court of Justice of the EU’ (2016) 70 International Organization, 377–408.
Note that the recent decision of the BVerfG on the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme
(PSPP), which I mention below, will offer new material to test old claims.
60 F Scharpf, ‘Perpetual momentum: directed and unconstrained’ (2012) 19 Journal of European
Public Policy, 127–39, 128.
61 There is significant literature on the European Court of Justice and its relations with national
courts. For representative contributions, see eg J Weiler, ‘The transformation of Europe’ (1991)
100 Yale Law Journal, 2403–83; J Weiler, ‘A quiet revolution—the European Court of Justice and
its interlocutors’ (1994) 26 Comparative Political Studies, 510–34; A-M Burley, ‘Europe before the
Court: a political theory of legal integration’ (1993) 47 International Organization, 41–76; K Alter,
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various ways in which these courts might seek to ‘resist’ or ‘pushback’ on the
CJEU’s rulings: for example, by failing to follow its interpretations, or by failing
to refer a case to the European court.62 Among Europe’s most influential courts
is the BVerfG. As Mayer points out, the BVerfG ‘never quite accepted the ECJ’s
role as final arbiter’.63 He notes that the BVerfG is effectively interpreting EU law
in the context of its ultra vires doctrine,64 which he describes as corresponding to
a ‘German constitutional law-based reserve of power over European acts’.65 The
BVerfG’s recent judgment on the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme
(PSPP) perfectly illustrates Mayer’s point.66 The PSPP is among the ECB’s non-
standard monetary policy measures and is supposed to help the ECB fulfil its
price stability mandate.67 Since this programme concerns the ECB’s role as
guardian of the single currency and not its role as bank supervisor under the
SSM, I will not dwell on this decision. Suffices to say that the judgment made
history because the BVerfG found for the first time that the ECB and the CJEU,
which in Weiss found the PSPP to be in accordance with EU law,68 had acted
ultra vires. Thus, the BVerfG held that Weiss had ‘no binding force in Germany’69
and that after a transitional period that could not exceed three months, the
German central bank was prevented from participating in the implementation
and execution of the relevant ECB decisions underpinning the PSPP, unless the
ECB addressed the failings that the BVerfG had identified in its judgment.70
Establishing the Supremacy of European Law: The Making of an International Rule of Law in Europe
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); M Pollack, ‘The new EU legal history: what’s new, what’s
missing?’ (2013) 28 American University International Law Review, 1257–310; M Bobek,
‘Landtová, Holubec, and the problem of an uncooperative court: implications for the preliminary
rulings procedure’ (2014) 10 European Constitutional Law Review, 54–89; A Dyevre, ‘Domestic ju-
dicial defiance in the European Union: a systemic threat to the authority of EU law’ (2016) 35
YEL, 106–44; A Hofmann, ‘Resistance against the Court of Justice of the European Union’ (2018)
14 International Journal of Law in Context, 258–74; T Pavone and R Kelemen, ‘The evolving judi-
cial politics of European integration: the European Court of Justice and national courts revisited’
(2019) 25 European Law Journal, 352–73.
62 See Hofmann (n 61); Pollack (n 61), 1294. For a fuller assessment of strategies that Member
States may deploy, see L Conant, Justice Contained: Law and Politics in the European Union (Ithaca,
NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).
63 See F Mayer, ‘Rebels without a cause? A critical analysis of the German Constitutional Court’s
OMT Reference’ (2014) 15 German Law Journal, 111–46, 116.
64 Ibid 116–17. See also F Mayer, ‘To boldly go where no court has gone before. The German
Federal Constitutional Court’s ultra vires Decision of May 5, 2020’ (2020) 21 German Law
Journal, 1116–27, 1117.
65 Mayer (n 63), 117. A second approach to review EU law is known as ‘Identitätskontrolle’ (iden-
tity review). A third is a fundamental rights review.
66 BVerfG, Judgment of the Second Senate of 5 May 2020—2 BvR 859/15, available at <https://
www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/e/rs20200505_2bvr085915en.html>.
67 See Case C-493/17 Weiss and others ECLI:EU:C:2018:1000, para. 70, confirming that the PSPP
falls within the monetary policy area. On the PSPP, see also eg B Cœuré, ‘Embarking on public
sector asset purchases’ (Frankfurt, 10 March 2015), available at <https://www.ecb.europa.eu/
press/key/date/2015/html/sp150310_1.en.html>.
68 Ibid.
69 BVerfG (n 66), para. 163.
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3. Dimensions of change
Following Campbell’s call to be explicit about the institutional dimensions that
one seeks to track, my final point is to identify which dimensions have analytical
relevance for studying change in the SSM. Hereinafter, I will introduce three in-
stitutional dimensions. I will coin them competence, powers, and governance.
These dimensions are analytically salient because they are directly relevant to
what is underpinning much of the wrangling about institutional choices in the
field of financial market/banking supervision: that is, the extent of centralization
and European integration.71 They represent the most important variables in bat-
tles between the EU and Member States about the institutional shape of financial
supervision. I will briefly elaborate on each of these dimensions.
‘Competence’ is the most powerful concept for our purposes. Competence
determines which actor has the authority to act in a given field or sector. For our
purposes, it is useful to think of ‘competence’ as having a Treaty sense and a legis-
lative sense. Under the Treaties, the two main relevant concepts are shared and
exclusive Union competence. Areas of exclusive Union competence are those
where ‘only the Union may legislate and adopt legally binding acts’.72 Member
States can only do so themselves ‘if so empowered by the Union or for the imple-
mentation of Union acts’.73 In areas of shared competence, both ‘the Union and
the Member States may legislate and adopt legally binding acts’.74 However,
Member States can only exercise their competence ‘to the extent that the Union
has not exercised its competence’.75
However, there is a second sense—a legislative sense—in which competence
can be understood. In this second sense, ‘competence’—that is, the legal author-
ity bestowed on an actor to act—is the outcome of choices made by the EU legis-
lature when adopting an act under a legislative procedure in a field of shared
(Treaty) competence. Thus, in the area of supervision, the EU legislature might
decide to vest an EU actor (eg an EU agency) with supervisory competence in a
given sector. In this context, it can also decide to confer this actor with exclusive
competence to carry out supervisory tasks. This conferral of exclusive supervisory
competence will, within the bounds set by the EU legislative act, result in a loss
of national supervisory competence. In this sense, exclusive competence is to
supervision what maximum harmonization is to rule-making. For example, in an
71 See also M Thatcher and D Coen, ‘Reshaping European regulatory space: an evolutionary ana-
lysis’ (2008) 31 West European Politics, 806–36, 809 who in their work on the evolution of the
European regulatory space refer to ‘strong debates about the extent of centralisation of powers at
the European level and the respective roles of the European Commission and national and EU
regulatory agencies, showing that implementing institutions link to wider political battles about in-
tegration and the form of the EU’.
72 Art. 2(1) TFEU.
73 Ibid.
74 Art. 2(2) TFEU.
75 Ibid.
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internal market context, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)
is exclusively responsible (or competent, in my terminology) for the registration
and supervision of credit rating agencies (CRAs).76 Since the internal market is an
area of shared competence, the choice to vest ESMA with this exclusive authority
was made by the EU legislature when adopting an EU regulation under Article
114 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Moreover,
since the principle of subsidiarity applies in areas of shared competence, the regu-
lation was adopted in accordance with this principle.77 Following its adoption, na-
tional authorities are prevented from unilaterally performing supervisory tasks
that are within the scope of ESMA’s competence. If a national authority carries
out such supervisory tasks, it will do so on the basis of a delegation by ESMA.78
‘Powers’ is about the means that an actor has to exercise its allocated compe-
tence. For our purposes, we can think of powers as a broad, rather diffuse, cat-
egory. In our context, it includes the power to take individual decisions (eg a
whole range of supervisory and investigatory powers). It also includes general de-
cision-making powers (eg the power to issue instructions to a group of actors).
The addressees of these powers are market actors, but also, depending on the
power, NCAs. The important point is that in our conceptualization, powers and
competence are essential aspects of authority. They are intrinsically linked: with-
out adequate powers, competence is a meaningless concept; without competence,
an actor lacks the authority to exercise its powers.
‘Governance’ comes into play where common structures are established: for ex-
ample, a forum, a committee or an agency. Such common structures can have di-
verse tasks: for example, to improve cooperation or coordination, to draft rules,
to ensure the implementation of rules by NCAs or their application by market
actors. In an EU context, the establishment of such bodies raises the question of
who has the say in such structures: that is, (i) representatives from NCAs who act
as members of such structures, but who remain accountable for their actions at
the national level and who are accordingly likely to ‘see the world’ primarily
through a national lens; or (ii) full-time appointees who are employed by such
structures and whose self-interest is accordingly more closely intertwined with
the fate of the common structure and who can therefore be assumed to have
greater incentives to defend its objectives.79 This distinction can be mapped onto
76 Rec. (6) of Regulation (EU) No 513/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
May 2011 amending Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 on credit rating agencies [2011] L145/30.
77 Rec. (35) ibid. On subsidiarity, see Art. 5(2) TEU. According to this provision, in areas of
shared competence, the EU is to act ‘only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action
cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States . . . but can rather, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved at Union level’.
78 Art. 30 of Regulation (EU) No 513/2011.
79 P Schammo, ‘Differentiated integration and the Single Supervisory Mechanism: which way for-
ward for the European Banking Authority’ in A Biondi and P Birkinshaw (eds), Britain Alone! The
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two ideal-type composite actors that Scharpf identifies: collective actors and cor-
porate actors. Scharpf defines collective actors as those that cannot determine
their courses of action autonomously, but are instead ‘dependent on and guided
by the preferences of their members’.80 Corporate actors meanwhile are more
hierarchical structures under the control of a leadership. Members (if any) are
‘not actively involved in defining the corporate actors’ course of action . . .’.81
According to Scharpf, these actors may allow a ‘degree of effectiveness and effi-
ciency that collective actors depending immediately on membership preferences
could not achieve’.82 For our purposes, the relevant point is that the say of NCAs
will be significantly diminished in the case of corporate actors given that decision
making is in the hands of appointed members and ‘decoupled from the preferen-
ces of the membership’;83 whereas it will be less so in the case of collective actors
since NCAs’ membership of the decision-making organs will ensure a continuing
say over the actions of such actors.84
To conclude, it is submitted that competence, powers, and governance are im-
portant institutional dimensions to account for when seeking to ascertain the
reality of change in the field of bank supervision. They are important because
they have proven to be salient variables in the wrangling between the EU and
Member States about the institutional shape of financial supervision. To be sure,
even after specifying institutional dimensions carefully, the question of whether
change should be characterized as evolutionary or revolutionary, continuous or
discontinuous, can be difficult to answer. Indeed, describing change in such sim-
ple dichotomous terms may often not do justice to a complex reality. Admittedly,
thinking of change in terms of a continuum, as Campbell suggests, represents an
improvement on this state of thinking.85 Even so, one needs to remain alert to
the risk of presenting impressionistic views when attempting to account for the
reality of change. At any rate, more important than to insist on particular labels
(evolutionary, revolutionary, etc) are for our purposes the mechanisms by which
change occurs over time in the SSM and in this context the role which courts, as
actors of change, have played in the continuous evolution of institutional dimen-
sions. Before addressing this point, it is however first necessary to set the stage by
examining the rules that were enacted in the SSM Regulation.
80 F Scharpf, Games Real Actors Play—Actor-Centered Institutionalism in Policy Research (Boulder,




84 Of course, the actual say will greatly depend on the decision-making procedures and especially
the voting requirements (e.g. unanimity, qualified majority, simple majority).
85 See text to (n 21).
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III. Institutional change and the creation of the Single
Supervisory Mechanism
For most of the EU’s existence, national supervision has been the approach in the
financial sector. Today the picture is markedly more complex and this is especial-
ly obvious in the Eurozone where efforts to deal with the sovereign debt crisis led
to the creation of the Banking Union. The SSM is the first pillar of the Banking
Union. In brief, the SSM is about prudential supervision of credit institutions
and to a lesser extent about macro-prudential supervision (that is, the supervision
of the financial system as a whole).
The aim of this section is to gain some initial insights on institutional change
in the SSM by examining the rules that were adopted in the SSM Regulation.
Specifically, this section focuses on the moment of institutional creation by exam-
ining the changes brought about by the SSM Regulation along the three dimen-
sions that I introduced earlier: competence, powers, and governance. By doing
so, this section will prepare the ground for an examination in the next section of
the role played by courts in the evolution of institutional dimensions - that is, es-
pecially the ‘competence’ dimension, which has proved to be the most contested
dimension. Hereinafter, I will focus on micro-prudential supervision, which is at
the heart of the SSM Regulation and the area that has seen the most activity be-
fore the courts.86 Each dimension is reviewed separately (competence in Section
III.A, powers in Section III.B and governance in Section III.C), after which I will
reflect on change during this phase of institutional creation (Section III.D).
A. Competence dimension
The most apparent change which the establishment of the SSM brought about
was a transfer of prudential supervisory competence over credit institutions from
the national to the EU level. By vesting the ECB with bank prudential compe-
tence, the ECB was given an entirely new role to play. No longer was it just the
guardian of the euro. It was given an important role to play in a core area of na-
tional economic activity, that is, banking.
The ECB’s new role was enacted in the SSM Regulation and further fleshed
out in an ECB regulation (the SSM Framework Regulation).87 The Treaty basis
on which the SSM Regulation was adopted is Article 127(6) TFEU. According
to this provision, the Council can ‘confer specific tasks upon the European
86 As far as macro-prudential tasks are concerned, suffices to say that the role of the ECB is more
limited. The ECB was vested with some powers to apply EU macro-prudential tools, but the pri-
mary responsibility for the macro-prudential toolkit continues to rest with national actors (see Art.
5, SSM Regulation).
87 See (n 1); Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 estab-
lishing the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the
European Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated author-
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Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit
institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance
undertakings’.
That said, the transfer of bank prudential competence was not without com-
plications. It rests horizontally on a complex interplay between different provi-
sions of the SSM Regulation. Vertically, it rests on a potentially uneasy relation
with the Treaty legal basis on which the SSM Regulation is based. The extent of
these complexities ought to be examined since resolving them, one way or an-
other, has important consequences for determining the nature and scope of the
ECB’s competence in the prudential field. Starting with the Treaty basis, it is fair
to say that there has been much debate about what Article 127(6) entails in terms
of conferring prudential competence on the ECB. For one thing, Article 127(6)
is in a Treaty chapter on monetary policy, which is an area of exclusive Union
competence and not an area of shared competence.88 On the other hand, how-
ever, the literature has made very good arguments why Article 127(6) TFEU did
not transform prudential supervision—the subject matter of the SSM—into an
exclusive Union competence,89 where Member States are excluded from acting
unless authorized by the Union. Questions have also been raised with respect to
the wording of Article 127(6) and especially whether the language of ‘confer[-
ring] specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating
to the prudential supervision . . .’ offers a suitable basis for vesting bank pruden-
tial supervision in the ECB.90 According to a narrow reading of this provision,
the term ‘specific’ seeks to limit in substance what the ECB can be vested with.
Thus, according to this reading, Article 127(6) does not permit a full transfer of
bank supervision to the ECB. However, according to an alternative reading, the
term ‘specific’ affects form rather than substance. Under this reading, ‘specific’
merely requires tasks to be clearly identified, so as not to be ‘generic’.91 These
questions were largely left unresolved, but it is apparent that the text of the SSM
Regulation was drafted with the wording of Article 127(6) in mind. Thus, the
ECB was given a list of ‘tasks’, which are found in Article 4(1) of the SSM
Regulation. However, these tasks are typical of any bank (prudential)
88 Art. 3(1) TFEU.
89 For details, see eg T Tridimas, ‘The constitutional dimension of Banking Union’ in S
Grundmann and H-W Micklitz (eds), The European Banking Union and Constitution—Beacon for
Advanced Integration or Death-Knell for Democracy (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019), 25–48, 36–8.
See also the excellent assessment of A de Gregorio Merino, ‘Institutional Report’ in Gy Bándi, P
Darák, A Halustyik, and P Láncos (eds), European Banking Union: FIDE Congress Proceedings
Volume 1 (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 2016), available at <http://fide-hungary.eu/
index.php?option¼com_content&view¼article&id¼106:e-books&catid¼2:uncategorised&lang¼
en&Itemid¼101>.
90 See Tridimas (ibid) for an overview.
91 Merino (n 89), para C.2.2.
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supervisor.92 Simplifying, they are about overseeing credit institutions, applying
relevant rules, and making sure that they are complied with.
The second complication concerns the interplay between certain provisions of
the SSM Regulation which are crucial for determining the scope of the ECB’s
competence under the SSM Regulation. The political negotiations over the
ECB’s competence have been extensively examined in the literature. It is well
known that the Commission proposal to vest the ECB with exclusive competence
to perform supervisory tasks over all credit institutions established within the
Banking Union faced resistance by a group of Member States led by Germany.93
The latter sought to maintain national supervision for smaller banks ‘in line with
lobbying from the German Landesbanken (regional banks) and Sparkassen (sav-
ings banks)’.94 As Merino notes, in the end it was agreed to differentiate between
‘significant’ entities, which are basically large credit institutions, and ‘less signifi-
cant’ entities, which are in essence smaller banks.95 The political compromise is
found in Article 4(1) and Article 6 of the SSM Regulation.96 As noted, the for-
mer provision specifies the bank prudential tasks which the ECB was vested with.
Specifically, it states that the ECB is ‘exclusively competent’ to carry out those
tasks in relation to ‘all credit institutions’ that are established in Member States
that participate in the Banking Union. However, Article 4(1) must be read to-
gether with Article 6. The latter is an especially convoluted provision. For our
purposes, it is sufficient to note that because of the scheme set out in Article 6,97
NCAs generally supervise less significant entities. Thus, NCAs carry out Article
4(1) tasks98 in relation to less significant entities—except for a couple of tasks
that are not dependent on the significance of a credit institution and that are a
matter for the ECB also in the case of less significant entities (eg authorizing
credit institutions or approving a qualified holding acquisition in a credit institu-
tion99). Significant entities are meanwhile directly supervised by the ECB.100
Article 6(4) sets out criteria that allow differentiating between significant and less
significant entities.
That said the relationship between Article 4(1) and Article 6 is ambiguous and
this ambiguity is at the origin of uncertainties about the allocation of competence
92 See eg Wymeersch (n 8), 13 noting that the ECB’s tasks constitute the ‘core activity of any pru-
dential supervisor’.
93 Merino (n 89), para. C.3.1.
94 Epstein and Rhodes (n 8), 423.
95 Merino (n 89), para. C.3.1.
96 See also A Witte, ‘Die Architektur des einheitlichen Bankenaufsichtsmechanismus und die
Bedeutung administrativer Widerspruchsverfahren im europäischen Prozessrecht—Anmerkung
zum Urteil des Gerichts der EU vom 16.5.2017 in der Rs. T-122/15 (L-Bank)’ (2017) 5
Europarecht, 648–57, 652.
97 For details, see Art. 6(4)–(6) SSM Regulation.
98 That is, the tasks found in Art. 4(1)(b), (d) to (g), and (i). See Art. 6(6).
99 See Art. 4(1)(a) and (c). See for details, also Arts 14 and 15.
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with respect to less significant entities. Witte notes in this context that the ar-
rangement between Article 4(1) and Article 6 can be read in different ways.101
On the one hand, one can give importance to Article 4(1) and the fact that it
talks of the ECB as having exclusive competence for the tasks in Article 4(1) in
relation to ‘all credit institutions’. Thus, according to this reading, the ECB is ex-
clusively competent for the supervisory tasks in Article 4(1)—both in relation to
significant entities and in relation to less significant entities; NCAs continue
supervising less significant entities merely because they were delegated certain
responsibilities in accordance with Article 6.102 On the other hand, however, one
can put greater weight on Article 6 and the opening wording of Article 4(1)
which specifically refers to Article 6 (‘[w]ithin the framework of Article 6, the
ECB shall . . . be exclusively competent . . .’). Under this reading, one might take
the view that the scope of the ECB’s exclusive competence is subject to the
scheme of Article 6. Accordingly, one might argue that the supervision of less sig-
nificant entities is, because of the reference to Article 6 in Article 4(1), excluded
from a transfer of competence to the EU level.103 Hence, one might conclude
that NCAs continue to carry out their tasks in relation to less significant entities
on the basis of pre-existing national competence.104 Arguably such a reading is
dovetailed by Article 127(6) TFEU, which only envisages that tasks be conferred
on the ECB, and not on NCAs.
B. Powers
To carry out its prudential tasks under the SSM Regulation, the ECB was given
extensive powers. These include supervisory and investigatory powers that are ex-
plicitly set out in the regulation.105 They also extend, pursuant to Article 9(1) of
the regulation, to the powers conferred on competent authorities under relevant
EU law (eg under capital requirements legislation).106 Indeed, where necessary
for the ECB to carry out its tasks and where the regulation does not vest such
powers in the ECB, the SSM Regulation also authorizes the ECB to act by way
of instructions and require NCAs to make use of their powers ‘under and in ac-
cordance with the conditions set out in national law’.107
Besides these supervisory and investigatory powers, the ECB was also given
powers to manage the division of responsibility with NCAs that supervise less
101 Witte (n 96), 652–3.
102 Ibid.
103 Ibid. That said, recall that in relation to a couple of tasks, such as the authorization of a credit
institution, the distinction between significant and less significant entities does not matter, and ac-
cordingly these tasks remain with the ECB regardless of significance (see text to n 99 above).
104 Ibid.
105 Arts 9–18 SSM Regulation. See especially, Art. 10 (investigatory powers); Art. 11 (general
investigations); Art. 12 (on-site inspections); Art. 14 (authorization); Art. 15 (assessment of acquis-
itions of qualifying holdings); Art. 16 (supervisory powers); Art. 18 (administrative penalties).
106 Art. 9(1) sub para. 2.
107 Art. 9(1) sub-para. 3.
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significant entities. Thus, the ECB can issue regulations, guidelines, or general
instructions to NCAs.108 It is empowered to ask the latter for information on the
performance of their tasks.109 It can make use of its investigatory powers.110 The
ECB also has a general oversight role to play.111 Crucially, the ECB can decide to
directly supervise a less significant entity ‘when necessary to ensure consistent ap-
plication of high supervisory standards’.112 This latter power is especially note-
worthy. It means that the ECB can take over the supervision of a less significant
entity from a national authority either on its own initiative or following a request
from an NCA.113 In sum, the SSM Regulation puts the ECB at the heart of the
SSM. Member States agreed to confer important powers on the ECB which were
previously exercised by NCAs. The ECB was also given direct powers over NCAs
that are involved in bank supervision under the SSM. The distinctiveness of the
SSM arrangements is further underscored by the fact that the SSM Regulation
not only requires the ECB to apply Union law, but also national laws that imple-
ment directives.114 Moreover, where Member States benefit from options under
EU regulations, the ECB must also apply the national laws which exercise those
options.115 These arrangements which see the ECB applying national law, have
been described as ‘rather unprecedented in the law of the Union’.116
That said, the exercise by the ECB of its powers can nevertheless be subject to
complications. Questions have for example been raised with respect to the powers
that are available to the ECB under Article 9(1) of the regulation, a provision
that I singled out above and which enables the ECB to benefit from powers
vested in competent authorities under Union legislation (eg the Capital




111 Art. 6(5)(c). See also Art. 6(1) which states that the ‘ECB shall be responsible for the effective
and consistent functioning of the SSM’.
112 Art. 6(5)(b). It can also use this power in case of financial assistance by the European Stability




116 Merino (n 89), para. 3.2.2.
117 Art. 9(1) sub-para. 2 can be read in different ways. The Commission for example has relied on
this provision, read together with Art. 64 of the Capital Requirements Directive (OJ [2013] L176/
338, as amended), to argue in favour of a broad reading of the ECB’s powers. Art. 64 provides in
broad and general terms that ‘[c]ompetent authorities shall be given all supervisory powers to inter-
vene in the activity of institutions that are necessary for the exercise of their function . . .’. Hence,
the Commission has argued that ‘the ECB should not only have the powers explicitly listed in the
CRD [Capital Requirements Directive] and the CRR [Capital Requirements Regulation], but also
all supervisory powers to intervene in the activity of credit institutions that were given to national
authorities for performing their broad supervisory function under the CRD and the CRR’. See
European Commission, ‘Report from the Commission to the European Parliament and the
Council on the Single Supervisory Mechanism established pursuant to Regulation (EU) No 1024/
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sources of law that the ECB must apply when performing its tasks, and indeed
because of the continuous role of NCAs in the SSM. The latter not only super-
vise less significant entities; they are also involved at an operational level in the ex-
ercise by the ECB of its SSM tasks. They prepare, for example, draft decisions
proposing to the ECB to grant authorization to a credit institution;118 they also
participate in so-called ‘joint supervisory teams’ (JSTs) which supervise signifi-
cant entities or significant supervised groups. That said, despite the involvement
of NCAs at this operational level, the ECB has not shied away from asserting its
role.119
C. Governance
The final dimension to consider is the governance dimension. At the outset, it is
worth acknowledging that any pooling of authority at EU level is bound to bring
about a reduction of authority for individual Member States and their NCAs.
But as already suggested, the extent of this reduction will nevertheless vary de-
pending on the ‘collective’ or ‘corporate’ nature of a composite actor.120 The fact
that the nature of a composite actor is a salient variable for Member States can be
illustrated by a very brief comparison with the governance of the European
Supervisory Authorities (ESAs).121 The ESAs are part of the European System of
Financial Supervision (ESFS).122 There are three ESAs: the European Securities
and Markets Authority (ESMA), the European Banking Authority (EBA), and
the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA). They
are responsible for a wide range of tasks, including, inter alia, the drafting of tech-
nical standards, improving the application of EU law, and working towards
greater coordination and cooperation between NCAs. In addition, ESMA acts as
77). For a criticism of this broad reading of the ECB’s powers, see R D’Ambrosio, ‘Single
Supervision Mechanism: organs and procedures’ in Chiti and Santoro (n 10), 157–82, 167–9.
118 Art. 14(2). See also Art. 15(2) in relation to the assessment of acquisitions of qualifying
holdings.
119 In relation to JSTs, for example, Chiti and Recini argue that the ECB has effectively sought to
put transnationalism ‘at the service of supranationalism’ (see E Chiti and F Recine, ‘The Single
Supervisory Mechanism in action: institutional adjustment and the reinforcement of the ECB pos-
ition’ (2018) 24 European Public Law 101–24, 111). They point out that in designing JSTs, the
ECB has sought to ensure that NCAs are under the ECB’s control and direction (ibid).
120 See Section II.B.3.
121 The founding regulations of these bodies are Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory
Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC
and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC [2010] OJ L 331/84, as amended; Regulation
(EU) No 1093/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 estab-
lishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), amending Decision No
716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/78/EC [2010] OJ L 331/12, as
amended; Regulation (EU) No 1094/2010 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24
November 2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority), amending Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing
Commission Decision 2009/79/EC [2010] OJ L 331/48, as amended.
122 Unlike the ECB, their geographical scope of activities extends to the EU as a whole.
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a day-to-day supervisor, but only in a few fields. These fields are, in contrast to
banking, not at the heart of Member State economies and have no true legacy of
NCA supervision.123
The ESAs were, like their predecessors, conceived as collective actors.124 As a
reminder, according to Scharpf, collective actors are actors that ‘are not autono-
mous in the choice of the preferences that guide their actions’.125 Rather they de-
pend on member preferences. It is plain that the ESAs are akin to collective
actors in the sense that the ESAs’ main decision-making bodies—the boards of
supervisors—are dominated by NCAs. The latter hold voting rights and have the
final say on the ESAs’ courses of action.126 Moreover, the latest revisions of the
ESAs’ founding regulations testify to the importance that Member States attach
to this state of affairs. Thus, Member States rejected attempts by the
Commission to vest some decision-making powers in newly appointed
independent members.127 To be sure, the influence of the ESAs’ chairpersons—a
full-time, independent professional—was strengthened following the latest
123 ESMA was vested with supervisory responsibility for Credit Rating Agencies and Trade
Repositories. Following the recent reforms of the founding regulations of the ESAs, ESMA will in
addition have responsibility for data reporting services providers and certain financial benchmarks
(for details, see Regulation (EU) 2019/2175 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18
December 2019 . . . [2019] OJ L334/1). ESMA also gained new powers over third-country central
counterparties (CCPs) that operate within the EU, including oversight powers over so-called ‘Tier-
2’ third-country CCPs which are deemed systemically important or are likely to become systemic-
ally important (for details, see Regulation (EU) 2019/2099 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 23 October 2019 amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 as regards the procedures
and authorities involved for the authorization of CCPs and requirements for the recognition of
third-country CCPs [2019] OJ L322/1). However, the Commission proposal to vest ESMA with
supervisory powers over securities prospectuses—that is in an area where NCAs have long been in
charge—was rejected. See, for details of the proposal, European Commission, ‘Proposal for a
Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council . . .’ (COM(2017) 536 final, 20
September 2017).
124 See P Schammo, EU Prospectus Law—New Perspectives on Regulatory Competition in Securities
Markets (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 28. The ESAs’ predecessors were the
Lamfalussy Level-3 committees (the Committee of European Securities Regulators, the
Committee of European Banking Supervisors and the Committee of European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Supervisors).
125 Scharpf (n 80), 54.
126 Decisions are mostly taken by simple majority or by qualified majority depending on the meas-
ures or decisions that an ESA seeks to adopt (see eg Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010 (n 120), as
amended, Art. 44). There are variations depending on the decision to be adopted (e.g. an Art-17
decision on breach of Union law might be taken by a written procedure and considered adopted
unless rejected by a simple majority, see ibid, Art. 44(4)). Moreover, in the case of EBA, additional
voting requirements were introduced in 2013 in order to accommodate the concerns of some
Member States (chiefly, the UK) which were not part of the Banking Union. See in this context,
Schammo (n 79).
127 Of particular relevance were the Commission’s proposals to entrust these appointed members,
as members of a new so-called Executive Board, with (inter alia) the power to make decisions in
the case of disagreements between NCAs or alleged breaches of Union law by NCAs (for the pro-
posals, see Commission (n 123) 20 and 22–3). If adopted, this would have been a significant
change which would have undermined the authority of national representatives, acting collectively
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revisions. On some matters, s/he will now have a right to vote in the ESAs’ super-
visory boards.128 However, adding the Chairperson to the voting members of the
Board of Supervisors evidently does not call into question the dominant role of
NCAs within the Board of Supervisors of each ESA.
Decision-making within the ECB offers a contrasting picture. The transfer
of supervision to the ECB entailed agreement on a governance set-up that
has much less fit with the description of a collective actor. To illustrate this
point, it suffices to focus on the broad lines of this set-up in the micro-pru-
dential field.129 The ‘planning and execution’130 of the ECB’s tasks is accord-
ing to the SSM Regulation in the hands of the Supervisory Board, an
internal organ, which is made of national representatives of participating
Member States and appointed members, which are the chair and vice-chair of
the Supervisory Board and four ECB representatives.131 The Supervisory
Board prepares draft decisions, but the final decision-making authority rests
with the ECB’s Governing Council which is made of the governors of central
banks in the euro area and appointed members (six members of the ECB’s
Executive Board, including the President of the ECB and its Vice-
President).132 Thus, from the present perspective, a key difference between
the ESAs and the ECB (in its role as bank supervisor) is the place and num-
ber of appointed members, with voting rights, in the governance set-up of
the ECB. As already noted, full-time appointees can, in contrast to national
representatives, be assumed to have better incentives to defend the interests
and objectives of the EU institution to which they belong. That is not to say
128 See eg Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, as amended (n 121), new Art. 40(1) and Art. 44. Note
that the Chairperson’s voting rights are more limited than those of representatives of NCAs. S/he
cannot vote on the matters referred to in the second sub-para of Art. 44(1), for example the adop-
tion of draft technical standards.
129 For a more detailed assessment, see C Ann Petit, ‘The SSM and the ECB decision-making gov-
ernance’ in Lo Schiavo (n 8), 108–29.
130 Art. 26(1) SSM Regulation.
131 Ibid. Within the Supervisory Board, decisions are taken by a simple majority of its members
and with each member having one vote, and the Chair a casting vote (Art. 26(6)). However, note
that the voting rights of appointed members differ in the case of decisions on the adoption of regu-
lations under Art. 4(3) of the SSM Regulation. These decisions are taken by qualified majority, as
provided for in the Treaties. The four ECB appointees have a vote that is ‘equal to the median vote
of the other members’ (for details, see Art. 26(7) SSM Regulation). Meanwhile, the votes of the
Chair and Vice Chair are, according to the ECB’s rules of procedure, ‘weighted zero and shall
count only towards the definition of the majority as far as the number of the members of the
Supervisory Board is concerned’. See Art. 13(c)(v) of the Decision of the European Central Bank
of 19 February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (ECB/2004/
2) [2004] OJ L80/33, as amended.
132 In the micro-prudential field, the main decision-making procedure is a non-objection proced-
ure: a draft decision of the Supervisory Board will be treated as adopted by the Governing Council
unless the latter objects to it. See Art. 13g of the Decision of the European Central Bank of 19
February 2004 adopting the Rules of Procedure of the European Central Bank (ECB/2004/2)
[2004] OJ L80/33, as amended. In the macro-prudential field, see for details P Schammo,
‘Inaction in macroprudential supervision: assessing the EU’s response’ (2019) 5 Journal of
Financial Regulation, 1–28, 27.
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that the ECB is a ‘corporate actor’ in the sense in which Scharpf uses this
term—that is, a hierarchical structure where ‘strategy choices are decoupled
from the preferences of the membership’.133. Nevertheless, in comparison to
the ESAs, appointed members play a much more prominent role in the
ECB’s governance set-up. As a result, the ECB is a much more hybrid actor
than the ESAs.134 Thus, in deciding to vest bank prudential supervision in
the ECB, Eurozone states agreed to share decision-making authority in a way
that they continue to resist in relation to the ESAs. Granted, the Treaty provi-
sions governing the ECB acted as an effective constraint on the type of deci-
sion-making arrangements that political leaders could envisage. Membership
of the Governing Council, the ultimate decision-making organ of the ECB, is
anchored in the Treaties.135 However, the same is not true of the Supervisory
Board, which is an internal organ, and whose membership was decided at the
point of institutional creation of the SSM. Moreover, even if vesting pruden-
tial supervision in the ECB was a somewhat natural choice,136 it was not the
only conceivable choice. Placing a collective actor, such as an EU agency, at
the heart of the SSM was among the options, although implementing this
choice would have been legally more challenging.
D. Assessing institutional change
In approaching the question of institutional change and how best to characterize
the changes brought about by the SSM Regulation, it is worth beginning by
acknowledging the complexities of the institutional set-up. On the one hand,
NCAs are part of the SSM. They continue supervising less significant entities
and remain involved at the operational level for the supervision of significant
entities. Decision making within the ECB also continues to depend on national
input. These elements point to a level of continuity. On the other hand, however,
one should not underestimate the magnitude of some of the changes. The ECB
was vested with direct supervisory competence over the largest credit institutions
(significant supervised entities) in the states that participate in the Banking
Union. Together, these account for almost 82 per cent of banking assets in these
states.137 By agreeing to transfer prudential supervision from the national to the
ECB level, Eurozone states agreed to hand over control over key actors of their
national economies to the ECB. As Howarth and Quaglia point out, this transfer
‘could only ever have been achieved in exceptional circumstances—which the
133 Scharpf (n 80), 56.
134 Schammo (n 132), 27. Petit describes the mix of national representatives and appointed mem-
bers as reflecting a mix of transnationalism and supranationalism (see Petit (n 129), 113).
135 See Art. 283 TFEU.
136 Merino (n 89), para. C.2.1. who also examines why the ECB was in the end chosen over alter-
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sovereign debt crisis created’.138 Agreement represented a major shift in policy
thinking—a quid pro quo for contemplating a direct future recapitalization of
failing banks.139 Indeed, Eurozone states not only agreed to pool authority. By
deciding to vest supervisory authority in the ECB, they agreed to share authority
with independent appointees within the ECB’s decision-making structures,
something that Member States have resisted in relation to the ESAs and which as
a result continue to better fit the description of collective actors. Moreover, as
was shown above, the ECB was given significant powers to carry out its duties,
including the power to replace an NCA as supervisor of a less significant entity
and the power to apply national laws.
Hence, it is possible to identify significant changes along all three dimensions
(competence, powers, and governance). If change is, as Campbell suggests, best
conceived as a continuum, the overall picture is arguably one that is somewhat
closer to being discontinuous than continuous. To be sure, even after specifying
each dimension carefully, there is room to disagree on how best to characterize
change overall. Indeed, as shown, there are elements of discontinuity and continu-
ity in the above description, notwithstanding that the original trigger of the reform
process was an exogeneous shock of the type described in the punctuated equilibria
literature.140 However, whether we label the overall state as amounting to continu-
ity or discontinuity is not in the end the most relevant point. The more important
point for the present purposes concerns how much of the changes that were enacted
in the SSM Regulation were left open to interpretation and therefore open to fu-
ture change and contestation. This brings me to the question of the supervision of
less significant institutions and what it tells us about change in the SSM.
As pointed out earlier, the relationship between Article 4(1) and Article 6 is
ambiguous and can be subject to contrasting readings. One reading supports the
view that NCAs retain their original competence to perform SSM tasks in respect
of less significant entities.141 A second, alternative, reading supports the ECB’s
138 D Howarth and L Quaglia, ‘Internationalised banking, alternative banks and the Single
Supervisory Mechanism’ (2016) 39 West European Politics, 438–61, 455.
139 See Euro Area Summit Statement, 29 June 2012, available at https://www.consilium.europa.
eu/media/21400/20120629-euro-area-summit-statement-en.pdf, which conditions a possible fu-
ture direct recapitalization of banks by the ESM on the establishment of an effective single super-
visory mechanism involving the ECB. See also Teixeira (n 9), 546.
140 This point also echoes Thelen’s conclusion that ‘institutional arrangements are incredibly resili-
ent and resistant even in the face of . . . exogeneous shocks of just the sort that one would expect to
disrupt previous patterns and give rise to institutional innovation’. See K Thelen, ‘How institutions
evolve—insights from comparative historical analysis’ in J Mahoney and D Rueschemeyer (eds),
Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2003) 208–40, 209.
141 To be clear, I am referring here to the Article 4(1) tasks of NCAs with respect to less significant
entities. Recall also that for a couple of tasks (Art. 4(1)(a) and (c)), the ‘significance’ of a credit in-
stitution plays no role (the authorization or withdrawal of authorization of a credit institution; or
the approval of a qualified holding acquisition in a credit institution). Under the SSM Regulation,
these tasks are few, but they are a matter for the ECB to decide, also with respect to less significant
entities.
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exclusive competence with respect to all credit institutions, including less signifi-
cant entities. The first reading downplays the salience of change in the compe-
tence pillar. Change is akin to what Thelen and others describe as layering: ‘an
existing institution is not replaced, but . . . new institutional layers—these might
for instance be rules, policy processes or actors—are added to it’.142 Thus under
this reading, the SSM Regulation does mostly not call into question the compe-
tence of NCAs in respect of less significant entities. However, it adds on top of
this national layer of supervisory competence, a new role (or new ‘layer’) for the
ECB, which is vested with, inter alia, an oversight role and powers under Article
6 which it can exercise with respect to NCAs that supervise less significant enti-
ties.143 Under the second reading, national competence is replaced by ECB com-
petence in respect of all supervised entities, including less significant entities.
NCAs act as mere agents of the ECB when exercising their tasks in respect of less
significant entities. Change in the competence dimension is further amplified
and pushed further along the discontinuous path.
That said, it is of course true that, whatever reading one adopts, the ECB’s
powers with respect to NCAs remain unchanged. They are those that are vested
in the ECB under the SSM Regulation. However, besides impacting national sov-
ereignty differently, these contrasting readings may have important implications
for the way in which the ECB exercises its powers. That is to say, an ECB whose
competence excludes less significant entities can be expected to behave differently
to an ECB whose exclusive competence extends to all entities. In the first case,
NCAs continue to be subject to national accountability lines (eg national parlia-
ments) when carrying out their SSM tasks, and the legitimacy of their actions
continues to be closely intertwined with the national level. Accordingly, one
would expect the ECB to behave more consensually towards NCAs. However, in
the second case, the ECB’s exclusive competence over all supervised entities
ensures that it has the necessary legitimacy to behave in a more hierarchical man-
ner towards NCAs and to apply its powers in a more pro-active way.144 NCAs
will have no choice other than to acknowledge the ECB as their principal. To be
sure, the question of how in practice the ECB behaves towards NCAs is one that
is best addressed empirically. However, in the absence of robust empirical work
on this issue, the above assumptions are nevertheless useful and reasonable.
Arguably, a reading which puts the ECB front and centre in the competence di-
mension, would also offer strong legitimizing reasons to those who wish to
strengthen the ECB’s powers over NCAs in the future. Although the ECB does
have significant powers, including the power to remove an NCA from the pruden-
tial supervision of a less significant entity, its powers have some noticeable limita-
tions. For example, whilst the ECB can issue general instructions on how NCAs
142 J van der Heijden, ‘Institutional layering: a review of the use of the concept’ (2011) 31 Politics,
9–18, 11.
143 For details, see Section III.A. and B. above.
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should perform their SSM tasks, it cannot currently address individual instructions
to an NCA.145 A pro-ECB interpretation of the competence mandate will offer
ammunition to actors who wish to see these restrictions removed in the future.
Indeed, arguably, a reading that supports ECB competence at the expense of
Member State competence might in the future also offer support to those who fa-
vour a stronger role for appointed ECB members in the Supervisory Board since
arguably in such a case the rationale for national membership of the Supervisory
Board is diminished. Admittedly, implementing such changes through legislative
amendment of the SSM Regulation would not be without complications since any
amendment would need to meet the unanimity hurdle of Article 127(6) TFEU.
However, change might still come incrementally through future interpretations of
the provisions of the SSM Regulation. In this context, a reading that puts the ECB
front and centre in the competence dimension might in the future come to sup-
port interpretations of other SSM rules that strengthen the ECB’s position, say,
with respect to the scope or range of powers that are available to the ECB.146
Accordingly one may posit that change in one dimension (the ‘competence’ di-
mension) may over time contribute to change in other dimensions (the ‘power’ di-
mension or the ‘governance’dimension) through a sort of feedback dynamic.
To sum up, the more we zoom in on issues of competence, the more apparent
that the way in which we characterize change—or the extent of change—depends
importantly on how we resolve the ambiguities that are inherent in the SSM
Regulation. Accordingly, in order to appreciate the extent of change, it is neces-
sary to look beyond the point of institutional creation and to consider the role of
courts in addressing legal ambiguities. Since the ambiguities in question stem
from an EU regulation, our focus naturally shifts to the CJEU as the ultimate au-
thority to interpret EU law in the EU legal order. Thus, in our conceptualization,
the question of how to characterize change (eg as layering or a more radical re-
placement) is itself a question of interpretation. However, given that the CJEU is
not at the top of an integrated judicial system, this characterization is not im-
mune from contestation. Hence, from our vantage point, institutional change
may not only be subject to contestation before courts, but also between courts:
that is, between the CJEU and national courts. It is to this point that I turn now.
IV. Institutional change and the courts
This section turns to the role played by courts in the evolution of the SSM, that
is, especially in the evolution of the first of the three institutional dimensions that
145 Art. 6(5)(a) SSM Regulation, referring to ‘general instructions’ only. This power to instruct
NCAs should not be mixed up with the one under Art. 9(1). Recall that according to Art. 9(1), the
ECB can instruct national authorities to use their powers where this is necessary for the ECB to
carry out its tasks under the SSM Regulation and where the latter does not confer such powers on
the ECB.
146 See eg the uncertainties with respect to Art. 9(1) which I highlighted above (see n 117 above).
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I examined above: the competence dimension. For this purpose, this section
examines the decision(s) of the CJEU in Landeskreditbank Baden-Württemberg v
ECB (or L-Bank) and the judgment of the BVerfG on the Banking Union.147 It
will draw on Mahoney’s and Thelen’s insights on modes of institutional change
in order to explain how each of these rulings contributed to the change problem-
atic. I will begin by discussing the CJEU’s decision(s) in L-Bank (Section IV.A),
after which I will focus on the BVerfG’s judgment on the Banking Union whose
importance from an institutional change perspective remains largely underappre-
ciated (Section IV.B). Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the judgment of
the BVerfG also deals, besides the SSM, with the Single Resolution Mechanism,
which is the second pillar of the Banking Union. My focus here is solely on the
SSM.
A. The CJEU’s decision(s) in L-Bank
In L-Bank, the General Court (GC) was asked to decide an annulment action.
L-bank wished to be supervised by the German NCA (the Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht or Bafin). Thus, L-Bank—a ‘significant entity’
according to the ECB—asked the ECB to agree to its reclassification based on a
specific provision of the SSM Regulation. Under this provision, the ECB can de-
cide that a credit institution, which would ordinarily be considered ‘significant’,
should—because of ‘particular circumstances’148—be reclassified and accordingly
be supervised nationally. However, the ECB refused to re-classify L-Bank. The
latter challenged the ECB’s decision before the GC. The GC sided with the ECB
and dismissed the action. The GC’s decision was subsequently upheld on appeal.
Admittedly, there was little at the outset to suggest that this annulment action
was destined to become a case of major significance for the SSM. The main issue
was relatively innocuous from an institutional point of view. However, the end
result was markedly different. L-Bank has become a landmark case on compe-
tence in the SSM. This is because in L-Bank, the GC took the opportunity to
make sweeping statements about the allocation of prudential competence to the
ECB. In short, the GC interpreted the provisions of the SSM Regulation in a
way that put the ECB front and centre in competence terms. Specifically, the GC
found that the ECB had exclusive competence in respect of the tasks set out in
the SSM Regulation (Article 4(1)) and that NCAs carried out their SSM tasks
with respect to less significant entities as a result of a ‘decentralized implementa-
tion’ of the ECB’s exclusive competence149 and not as a result of ‘the exercise of a
national competence’.150
147 See (n 12) and (n 2).
148 Art. 6(4), second sub-para. See also Arts 70 and 71 SSM Framework Regulation which flesh
out the SSM provision.
149 Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 63.
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In coming to this finding, the GC examined the interplay between two key
provisions which we discussed earlier, that is, Article 4(1) which determines the
ECB’s prudential tasks and provides that the ECB is exclusively competent to ex-
ercise those tasks in relation to all credit institutions within the Banking Union;
and Article 6 pursuant to which NCAs are generally responsible for the Article
4(1) tasks in relation to less significant entities.151 The GC found that this inter-
play did not support a distribution of competence between the ECB and
NCAs.152 In reaching this conclusion, the GC placed greater weight on Article
4(1). For the court, it was ‘at the stage of the definition of the tasks’ vested in the
ECB by Article 4(1) that competences were distributed.153 Article 6 was merely
there to enable a ‘decentralized implementation’ of the ECB’s exclusive compe-
tence by NCAs in respect of less significant entities.154 Moreover, according to
the GC, its findings were supported by both the text and the recitals of the SSM
Regulation. Thus, the court inferred from the recitals that direct supervision by
NCAs under the SSM was merely envisaged as a ‘mechanism of assistance to the
ECB’ and not as an ‘exercise of autonomous competence’.155 The ECB’s powers
over NCAs (ie the power to issue regulations, guidelines, and general instruc-
tions, as well as the power to take over the supervision of a less significant entity),
were for the GC also ‘indicative of the subordinate nature of the intervention by
the NCAs in the performance of [the Article 4(1)] tasks’.156 The fact that the
Council, which had adopted the SSM Regulation, decided to associate NCAs in
the implementation of the tasks under Article 4(1) did ‘not allow any conclusions
to be drawn as to maintaining prudential supervisory competence for the nation-
al authorities’ with regards to the tasks in Article 4(1).157 Remarkably, the open-
ing wording of Article 4(1), which stipulates that it is ‘[w]ithin the framework of
Article 6’ that the ECB is exclusively competent to perform the tasks of Article
4(1), played no part in the GC’s assessment of the scope of the ECB’s compe-
tence under the SSM Regulation.
The decision of the GC was subsequently appealed before the Court of Justice
(CJ).158 The latter was arguably a bit more circumspect.159 But the CJ confirmed
the decision of the GC entirely.160 Indeed, at no point, when considering the
interplay between Article 4 and Article 6, did the CJ suggest that the GC was
151 By tasks I mean those found in Art. 4(1)(b), (d) to (g) and (i). See Art. 6(6).
152 Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 54.
153 Ibid, para. 56.
154 Ibid, para. 63.
155 Ibid, para. 58. In fact, the court made this inference based on the way in which the recitals were
arranged in the regulation.
156 Ibid, paras 59–61.
157 Ibid, para. 64.
158 Case C-450/17 P (n 12).
159 For example, the CJ was careful to avoid referring to the existence of an exclusive Union compe-
tence as the GC had done (see Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 72). It simply referred to ‘exclusive
competence’. For further details on this point, see below.
160 See especially para. 49, in which the CJ referred to paras 54, 63, and 72 of the GC’s decision.
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wrong and that NCAs carried out their SSM tasks on the basis of pre-existing
(national) competence. Instead, the CJ confirmed the GC’s views when noting
that the latter’s interpretation of the ECB’s competence could not be invalidated
by L-Bank’s arguments which were ‘based on the postulate that the national
authorities retain, under Article 6(4) of [the SSM Regulation] their competence
. . .’ for performing the tasks of Article 4(1).161 AG Hogan was more forthright
on this point in his opinion when stating that he could not agree ‘with the claim
by the appellant that [national] authorities retain their pre-existing competences
in respect of [less significant] entities’.162 Referring to the GC’s decision, the CJ
concluded that NCAs were acting within the scope of a decentralized implemen-
tation of an exclusive competence of the ECB, which was enabled by Article
6.163
Pizzolla argues that in approaching the SSM Regulation, one should differenti-
ate between competence, powers, and responsibilities.164 The distinction appears
to agree with the GC’s and CJ’s approach. NCAs are responsible for carrying out
certain tasks under Article 4(1) in relation to less significant entities. They can ex-
ercise relevant powers and are authorized to adopt all relevant supervisory deci-
sions in relation to these entities. However, when it comes to the competence
question, matters are different. According to the CJEU, NCAs act within the
scope of a decentralized implementation of an ECB exclusive competence and
not on the basis of pre-existing national competence when performing their SSM
tasks in relation to less significant banks.
To sum up, in a decision that ‘surprised practitioners and academics alike’165
the GC tipped the balance of competence between the ECB and NCAs resolutely
in the ECB’s favour. When deciding that NCAs acted within the scope of a
decentralized implementation of an ECB exclusive competence and not on the
basis of national competence, the CJEU rejected a reading of the SSM
Regulation that would have been consistent with a ‘layering’ of rules and which
would have preserved the original (national) competence of NCAs in respect of
less significant entities. Instead, the GC ‘deployed’ the provisions and recitals of
the SSM Regulation in support of the ECB and legal integration within the SSM.
161 Ibid, para. 36. See also para. 49 which refers explicitly to (inter alia) paras 54 and 72 of the
GC’s judgment. In the latter paragraph of the GC’s judgment, the GC states that ‘. . . under the
SSM the national authorities are acting within the scope of decentralised implementation of an ex-
clusive competence of the Union, not the exercise of a national competence’ (emphasis added).
162 See AG Opinion, Case C-450/17 P (n 12) ECLI:EU:C:2018:982, para. 53.
163 Case C-450/17 P (n 12) para. 49, noting that the ‘the Council conferred on the ECB exclusive
competence, the decentralised implementation of which by the NCAs is enabled by Article 6 of
that regulation, under the SSM and under the control of the ECB, in relation to less significant
credit institutions’.
164 A Pizzolla, ‘The role of the European Central Bank in the Single Supervisory Mechanism: A
new paradigm for EU governance’ (2018) 43 European Law Review, 3–23.
165 R Smits, ‘After L-Bank: how the Eurosystem and the Single Supervisory Mechanism may de-
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By the same token, it amplified change in the competence dimension. Enabling
this decision were the ambiguities and incompleteness of the SSM Regulation.
Hence, L-Bank perfectly illustrates how institutional change can be based on en-
dogenous developments that take place after the moment of institutional creation,
and how in this context legal ambiguities can lead to change by way of conversion.
To be sure, L-Bank is not the only decision of the CJEU on the SSM where
important institutional developments have taken place in the ‘malleable’ space
between rule enactment and rule interpretation.166 L-Bank was followed by
Berlusconi, a case in which the CJEU ruled in favour of its own jurisdiction to re-
view (national) preparatory acts in so-called composite administrative proce-
dures.167 Composite procedures entail decision making by both national
administrative authorities and EU authorities and can be found across a range of
policy areas.168 The judicial review of these procedures is an area where the
Treaties fail to offer straightforward answers and where developments have ac-
cordingly taken place incrementally at the hand of the CJEU. Under the SSM,
one such composite procedure concerns the assessment of the acquisition of qual-
ifying holdings in credit institutions.169 It is one of a very few procedures under
the SSM Regulation where the distinction between significant and less significant
entities does not matter.170 Whilst the procedure involves NCAs which receive
applications for an intended acquisition of a qualifying holding and carry out as-
sessment work, it is the ECB that is solely competent to decide the fate of the ap-
plication, following a (non-binding) proposal by the relevant NCA.171 In
Berlusconi, the national referring court asked the CJEU whether national or EU
courts had jurisdiction to review the legality of (national) preparatory acts in the
above procedure.172 The CJEU held that where national preparatory acts did not
bind an EU institution having ‘final decision-making power’,173 national courts
had to be denied jurisdiction to review national preparatory acts.174 It was for
166 See also Mahoney and Thelen (n 17), 14 who speak of change that emerges ‘in the “gaps” or
“soft spots” between the rule and its interpretation’.
167 Case C-219/17 Berlusconi and Fininvest v Banca d’Italia ECLI:EU:C:2018:1023. For an excel-
lent case comment, see F Brito Bastos, ‘Judicial review of composite administrative procedures in
the Single Supervisory Mechanism: Berlusconi’ (2019) 56 CML Rev, 1355–78.
168 On these procedures, see eg F Brito Bastos, ‘Derivative illegality in European composite admin-
istrative procedures’ (2018) 55 CML Rev, 101–34; H Hofmann, ‘Composite decision making pro-
cedures in EU administrative law’ in H Hofmann and A Türk (eds), Legal Challenges in EU
Administrative Law—Towards an Integrated Administration (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2009),
136–67.
169 See Art. 15 SSM Regulation.
170 The other such procedure concerns the authorization, and the withdrawal of authorization, of a
credit institution. See Art. 14 and text to (n 99) above.
171 See Art. 4(1)(c) and Art. 15 SSM Regulation. There are additional provisions under the CRD,
but they can be left aside for the present purposes.
172 Case C-219/17 (n 167).
173 Ibid, para. 43.
174 Ibid, paras 44–51, especially para. 47. The CJEU also held that matters were different where in
a composite procedure, EU institutions had ‘only a limited or no discretion, so that the national
act is binding on the EU institution’. It went on to note that ‘[i]t then falls to the national courts to
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EU courts to examine any defects vitiating the national preparatory acts that
could taint the validity of EU decisions.175 The Court sought support for its
views in previous case law, as well as in the Treaties—especially the Treaty provi-
sion on the action for annulment which it interpreted in light of the general prin-
ciple of sincere cooperation.176 Thus, in the case in point, since it was the ECB
who had final decision-making authority, it was a matter for the EU courts to re-
view whether the ECB decision was tainted by ‘any defects rendering unlawful’
the national preparatory acts.177 That jurisdiction, according to the CJEU,
‘exclude[d] any jurisdiction of national courts in respect of those acts . . .’.178
Berlusconi is widely seen as a case whose significance extends beyond the SSM
context.179 It was also a pillar of the CJEU’s recent decision in Iccrea.180 Since
this latter case concerns the Single Resolution Board (SRB)—the EU body at the
centre of the Single Resolution Mechanism, the second pillar of the Banking
Union—suffices to say that the CJEU applied Berlusconi and its findings on its
own jurisdiction when considering the role played by national courts in the con-
text of an SRB composite procedure.181
Before concluding this subsection, it is worth returning a final time to the
CJEU’s decisions in L-Bank in order to highlight one additional point about
rule on any irregularities that may vitiate such a national act—making a reference to the Court for
a preliminary ruling where appropriate—on the same terms as those on which they review any de-
finitive act adopted by the same national authority which is capable of adversely affecting third par-
ties and moreover, in the light of the principle of effective judicial protection, to regard an action
brought for that purpose as admissible even if the national rules of procedure do not so provide’.
See ibid, paras 45 and 46.
175 Case C-219/17 (n 167), para. 44.
176 See Arts 263 TFEU and 4(3) TEU.
177 Case C-219/17 (n 167), para. 57.
178 Ibid.
179 See Bastos, (n 167), 1367–8.
180 Case C-414/18 Iccrea Banca SpA v Banca d’Italia ECLI:EU:C:2019:1036.
181 Specifically, the case raised the question of the role of national courts in reviewing actions of na-
tional resolution authorities taken in the context of decisions by the Single Resolution Board
(SRB) on the financial contribution of banks to the Single Resolution Fund (SRF). Having con-
cluded—contrary to the views of the SRB (see the legal opinion of AG Campos Sánches-Bordona
in Case C-414/18 Iccrea Banca SpA v Banca d’Italia ECLI:EU:C:2019:574, para. 50)—that with
respect to the calculation of ex ante contributions to the SRF, the SRB ‘exclusively exercise[d] the
final decision-making power’ (Case C-414/18 (n 180), para 47), and that national resolution
authorities provided only ‘operational support’ to the SRB (ibid), the CJEU found, in accordance
with its Berlusconi case law, that only EU courts had jurisdiction, when reviewing the legality of the
SRB’s decision, to determine whether a preparatory act of a national resolution authority was
affected by defects that could taint the decision of the SRB (ibid 48): ‘no national court can review
that national act’ (ibid). The CJEU also considered the role of national resolution authorities and
national courts in the part of the procedure that followed the adoption by the SRB of its decision
on bank contributions. At this stage, national resolution authorities are required to notify banks of
the contributions that they must make to the SRF, as well as to raise the relevant contributions
from them. The CJEU noted that neither the national resolution authorities, nor national courts
which were asked to review the actions of the former, could take decisions that ‘conflict[ed] with
decisions of the [SRB] on the calculation of the ex ante contributions to the SRF and which, in
practice, deprive the latter decisions of their effects, by impeding the raising of those contributions’
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these rulings. It is plain that the decisions of the GC and the CJ were far from
resolving all ambiguities and uncertainties. Indeed, they created altogether new
ones.182 Fundamental notions for delimiting the scope of the ECB’s exclusive
competence—think of the notion of a ‘decentralized implementation’ of an ECB
exclusive competence—were not fleshed out and left open to future interpret-
ation.183 The question of how the L-Bank rulings square with the Treaty compe-
tence construct and especially with Article 127(6) TFEU (the Treaty article on
which the SSM Regulation is based) were also not addressed. Recall that the
GC’s findings on the ECB’s exclusive supervisory competence were purely a mat-
ter of statutory interpretation: that is, of the binding text of the SSM Regulation
and of the text’s recitals. Nevertheless, even if one looks in vain for a mention of
Article 127(6) TFEU, the GC, when examining a question about subsidiarity,
approached subsidiarity as if the ECB benefited from an exclusive Union—that
is, Treaty—competence. In such a case, subsidiarity considerations are excluded.
Matters are different where, in the absence of an exclusive Union competence,
choices about the allocation of supervisory competence are made by the EU legis-
lature when adopting an act under a legislative procedure in an area of shared
competence.184 Subsidiarity ought to apply. Indeed, in the case of the SSM
Regulation, it is plain that the regulation was adopted with subsidiarity in
mind.185 Remarkably, however, the GC found in L-Bank that subsidiarity con-
siderations were excluded since ‘under Article 5(3) TEU, [the principle of sub-
sidiarity] applies only in areas which do not fall within exclusive EU
competence’.186 Unfortunately, the GC did not offer any additional insight. It
moved on quickly without elaborating further.
B. The BVerfG’s judgment on the Banking Union
Having examined the decisions of the CJEU, I turn next to the judgment of the
BVerfG in order to contrast the findings of the latter court with those of the
CJEU. As already noted, the BVerfG rejected the constitutional complaint
directed against the Banking Union. However, the more relevant point is that in
reaching this conclusion, the BVerfG came to markedly different findings on the
scope of the ECB’s competence under the SSM Regulation. The essential bone of
contention concerns the question of competence over less significant institutions.
182 Incidentally the same can be said of the Berlusconi decision, which left important questions
about the content of the CJEU’s judicial review of national preparatory acts open. For an assess-
ment, see Bastos (n 168), 1375–7.
183 See F Annunziata, ‘European banking supervision in the age of the ECB: Landeskreditbank
Baden Würtemberg—Förderbank v. ECB’ (2020) 21 European Business Organization Law Review,
545–70.
184 See in this context Section II.B.3.
185 SSM Regulation, recital 87.
186 Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 65. Note that the issue of subsidiarity merely arose in relation to a
question of interpretation and not a plea of illegality (ibid, para. 38). For a very good assessment of
the subsidiarity issue, see also Witte (n 96), 654–5.
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Recall that according to the CJEU, NCAs carry out their tasks under Article 4(1)
as a result of a ‘decentralized implementation’ of an ECB exclusive compe-
tence187 and not as a result of the exercise of pre-existing national competence.188
However, for the BVerfG this is not so: NCAs exercise their supervisory tasks
with respect to less significant entities on the basis of national competence and
not on the basis of ECB competences that were delegated back to them
(Rückdelegation).189
The decision of the BVerfG is densely argued and accordingly one is at risk of
failing to see the wood for the trees. Hence, I will only focus on some key points
of contrast with the decisions of the CJEU. Specifically, I will show that with re-
spect to the allocation of competence over less significant entities, the BVerfG’s
findings are broadly consistent with layering: the original (national) layer of com-
petence of NCAs is for the most part preserved; the fact that the SSM Regulation
vested the ECB, as far as less significant entities are concerned, with a new role
and a range of powers, did not call this finding into question. Hence, I will show
hereinafter that by using legal reasoning, which offers legitimacy and an impres-
sion of objectivity, the BVerfG was able to ‘redirect’ the relevant rules in support
of a new outcome - that is, one that rejects the idea of a ‘decentralized implemen-
tation’ of an ECB exclusive competence by NCAs and supports a distribution of
competence between NCAs and the ECB. In making these findings, the BVerfG
contested the extent of institutional change, as ‘discovered’ by the CJEU in its
L-Bank rulings. Enabling this process of conversion were, as in the case of the
L-Bank rulings, ambiguous and incomplete legal provisions.
It is plain that the BVerfG approached the question of competence differently
to the CJEU. According to the BVerfG, a redelegation of ECB tasks to NCAs—
as opposed to the case where NCAs act on the basis of pre-existing national com-
petence—would presuppose that bank supervision had been fully transferred to
the ECB.190 However, according to the German court, taking this view would
fall foul of Article 127(6) TFEU, the Treaty legal basis on which the SSM
Regulation was founded.191 Hence, unlike EU courts, the BVerfG began by
examining the competence question through the lens of the Treaties and the
Treaty competence construct. Recall in this context that Article 127(6), and what
it precisely entails, has been subject to debate and controversy. Earlier we saw
187 Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 63; Case C-450/17 P (n 12), 49.
188 Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 72.
189 See especially BVerfG, (n 2), paras 183–197. This part of the judgment should be read together
with paras 172–182. Note that in the English translation of the judgment, paras 188–196, which
are a key part of the BVerfG’s reasoning on the issue of competence allocation with respect to less
significant entities, were not translated into English. I therefore mostly relied on my own transla-
tion of the German text.
190 Ibid, para. 185, noting that ‘a re-delegation of EU administrative tasks would require that all
supervisory tasks had been fully conferred on the ECB. . .’. See also para. 187 noting that ‘[a] re-
delegation of EU administrative tasks would require that all supervisory tasks had fully been con-
ferred on the ECB. . .’.
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that the provision can be read in different ways.192 Recall also that the L-Bank
rulings did not offer any new insights on Article 127(6). The EU courts’ findings
on the ECB’s exclusive competence in respect of the SSM tasks, and on a decen-
tralized implementation of this exclusive competence by NCAs, were based pure-
ly on an assessment of the SSM Regulation. The BVerfG on the other hand
focused extensively on what Article 127(6) permits and—importantly—what it
does not permit.193 It adopted a narrow reading of the wording of Article 127(6)
and stressed that Article 127(6) did not transform prudential supervision into an
area of exclusive Union competence that could entail a redelegation.194 Crucially,
the SSM Regulation had, as an instrument of secondary law, to be interpreted in
light of the higher order (Treaty) legal basis, and by taking account of the subsidi-
arity principle.195
Turning to the SSM Regulation, the BVerfG found support for its views on a
division of competence between the ECB and NCAs. It examined both the reci-
tals and the binding text of the SSM Regulation,196 including the interplay be-
tween Article 4(1) and Article 6. Recall that Article 4(1) sets out the prudential
tasks for which the ECB is exclusively competent in relation to all credit institu-
tions, but because of Article 6, NCAs generally supervise less significant credit
institutions. When considering the interplay between these provisions, the
BVerfG clearly did not find, as the GC had found, that the ‘sole purpose’197 of
Article 6 was to enable a decentralized implementation of the ECB’s exclusive
competence. Instead, the BVerfG placed greater weight on Article 6 when finding
that the ECB was—only within the framework of Article 6—competent for the
tasks listed in Article 4(1).198 Nor did the BVerfG find, as the GC had found,
that the recitals of the SSM Regulation supported the view that national supervi-
sion was merely a ‘mechanism of assistance to the ECB’ rather than the ‘exercise
of autonomous competence’.199 Instead, the BVerfG effectively downplayed the
importance of the SSM Regulation for the supervision of less significant entities,
when suggesting, after examining the recitals of the SSM Regulation and those of
192 See in this context, the earlier discussion on competence in Section III.A.
193 See esp. ibid, paras 160–170.
194 Ibid, para. 186 and para. 190.
195 Ibid, para. 189. The BVerfG confirmed that the subsidiarity principle had not been infringed
by the SSM Regulation in para. 197. Recall that the GC found subsidiarity not to apply (see para.
65 of Case T-122/15 (n 12)).
196 BVerfG (n 2), paras 192–193. For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that the BVerfG also
looked in this context at the recitals of the SSM Framework Regulation, a piece of secondary legis-
lation that was adopted by the ECB and which fleshes out the provisions of the SSM Regulation.
See Regulation (EU) No 468/2014 of the European Central Bank of 16 April 2014 establishing
the framework for cooperation within the Single Supervisory Mechanism between the European
Central Bank and national competent authorities and with national designated authorities (SSM
Framework Regulation) (ECB/2014/17) [2014] OJ L 141/1.
197 Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 63.
198 BVerfG (n 2), para. 193.
199 Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 58.
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the SSM Framework Regulation, that the supervision of less significant entities
was essentially not the subject of Union regulation.200
Crucially, the ECB’s most potent power under Article 6(5)—that is, the right
to take over the supervision of a less significant entity—did not call into question
the BVerfG’s conclusions on a division of competence. To be sure, the BVerfG
acknowledged that the ECB had an oversight role to play and benefited from a
range of powers over NCAs, including the power to take over the supervision of
a less significant entity. Recall that for the GC, the existence of this latter power
(alongside the power to issue regulations, guidelines, or general instructions) was
indicative of the subordinate role played by NCAs.201 Ultimately, it contributed
to the GC’s finding that the ‘sole purpose’ of Article 6 was to ‘enable a decentral-
ised implementation’ of the ECB’s exclusive competence.202 In the BVerfG’s ana-
lysis, the existence of this power had no such consequence. For the BVerfG, the
power of the ECB to take over the supervision of a less significant entity (the
ECB’s Selbsteintrittsrecht) was a measure of last resort and as such merely an ex-
ception which did not call into question the role of NCAs with respect to less sig-
nificant entities pursuant to the SSM Regulation.203 Hence, it is submitted that
in contrast to EU courts, the BVerfG adopted an altogether different understand-
ing of the relevance of the ECB’s Selbsteintrittsrecht for determining questions of
competence. In the case of the GC, the existence of this power supported the
GC’s findings on a decentralized implementation of an ECB exclusive compe-
tence. However, according to the BVerfG, it was only in concreto, when exercised,
that the ECB’s Selbsteintrittsrecht mattered for determining questions of supervis-
ory competence. Thus, as long as the ECB did not exercise its right to take over
the supervision of a less significant entity, which according to the BVerfG could
only be a measure of last resort, the ECB did not have supervisory competence
over a less significant entity204—except, of course, for a few supervisory tasks for
which the ECB is solely competent irrespective of the ‘significance’ criterion.205
The BVerfG concluded with what could be seen as a red flag for the future: the
200 BVerfG (n 2), para. 192. The BVerfG did however acknowledge that the ECB had the power to
take over the supervision of a less significant entity in certain circumstances. See also below.
201 Case T-122/15 (n 12), paras 59–61.
202 Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 63.
203 BVerfG (n 2), para. 193, noting that ‘[d]as Selbsteintrittsrecht der EZB nach Art. 6 Abs. 5
SSM-VO ist als Ultima Ratio eine Ausnahme und stellt die in Art. 6 Abs. 6 SSM-VO niedergelegte
Regel nicht in Frage’. Art. 6(6) which the BVerfG singles out cross-refers to Art. 4(1) in order to
specify the SSM tasks for which NCAs are responsible in relation to less significant entities.
204 See in this context para. 195 where the BVerfG notes that ‘[d]ie der EZB durch den EuGH
zuerkannte ausschließliche Befugnis zur Definition des Begriffs dieser ,,besonderen Umstände“setzt
voraus, dass ihr eine ausschließliche Aufsichtskompetenz hinsichtlich aller Institute zusteht, die
nach den Kriterien von Art. 6 Abs. 4 UAbs. 2 SSM-VO grundsätzlich als bedeutend gelten. Sie
erfordert jedoch keine umfassende Aufsichtskompetenz der EZB auch bezüglich der nach diesen
Kriterien als weniger bedeutend geltenden Kreditinstitute, solange die EZB nicht von ihrem
Selbsteintrittsrecht nach Art. 6 Abs. 5 SSM-VO Gebrauch macht.’(emphasis added).
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SSM Regulation would have to be deemed ultra-vires if it had fully transferred
bank supervision to the ECB.206
Somewhat unexpectedly, the BVerfG also found that the L-Bank decisions of
the CJEU were perfectly reconcilable with its views. To be sure, there were points
of agreement between the courts. These concerned the role of the ECB in relation
to significant entities207 and the point that supervisory tasks which are outside the
SSM Regulation were within national competence.208 Moreover, there was agree-
ment on the point that the ECB also had sole competence over a few tasks in re-
spect of less significant credit institution (eg the authorization of a credit
institution).209 Recall that for these (few) tasks,210 the significance criterion does
not matter. However, on the crucial question of whether NCAs carry out their
SSM tasks on the basis of national competence or on the basis of a decentralized
implementation of an ECB exclusive competence,211 the BVerfG’s findings con-
trasted markedly with those of the CJEU. Yet, as pointed out, the BVerfG con-
cluded that the CJEU’s findings in L-Bank did not stand in its way.212 It is plain
that reaching this conclusion required some legal gymnastics. The BVerfG, for ex-
ample, deemed the general findings on competence allocation in L-Bank to be of
limited relevance to the ruling.213 In the literature, Gentzsch and Brade talk in
this context of obiter dicta by the CJEU.214 Whether the CJEU’s findings on the
scope of the ECB’s exclusive competence should be disregarded on this ground
is, however, far from obvious.215 At any rate, what is essential or not in the
206 BVerfG (n 2), para. 194.
207 BVerfG (n 2), para. 175; Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 22.
208 BVerfG (n 2), para. 180; Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 56.
209 BVerfG (n 2), para. 173; Case T-122/15 (n 12), para. 22.
210 See Art. 4(1)(a) and (c). See also text to nn (98)–(99) above.
211 Art. 6(6) SSM Regulation.
212 BVerfG (n 2), para. 195.
213 See BVerfG (n 2), para. 195 for details. Essentially, according to the BVerfG, the dispute before
the CJEU in L-Bank was merely about the interpretation of the meaning of ‘particular circumstan-
ces’. Bundesfinanzministerium, ‘Die Europäische Bankenunion vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht’
(BMF-Monatsbericht, September 2019), 11 available athttps://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/
Monatsberichte/2019/09/Inhalte/Kapitel-3-Analysen/3-1-europaeische-bankenunion-vor-bverfg.
html. See also Federal Financial Supervisory Authority, ‘Banking Union legally valid’ (19
September 2019), https://www.bafin.de/SharedDocs/Veroeffentlichungen/EN/Fachartikel/2019/
fa_bj_1908_Bankenunion_Urteil_BVErfG_en.html, noting that ‘[t]he German judges avoided
clashing with their EU counterparts by regarding their general statements on the allocation of
responsibilities within the SSM as irrelevant to the ruling’.
214 Gentzsch and Brade (n 11), 618.
215 As AG Römer put it in Netherlands v High Authority ‘[t]he question where, in judgments, the
decisive grounds of judgment end and any obiter dicta begin seems to me in any case to be of sec-
ondary importance. In each case everything that is said in the text of the judgment expresses the
will of the Court’. See Opinion of AG Römer in Case 9/61 Netherlands v High Authority
ECLI:EU:C:1962:20, cited in A Arnull, ‘Owning up to fallibility: precedent and the Court of
Justice’ (1993) 30 CML Rev, 247–66, 249, noting further that ‘[a] corollary of the absence of a
doctrine of binding precedent in Community law is that the distinction between the ratio decidendi
of a judgment of the Court and obiter dicta loses much of its significance’.
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CJEU’s jurisprudence is ultimately a question for the CJEU and not for the
BVerfG to decide.216
The BVerfG also interpreted the recitals of the SSM Regulation in an unusual
way. Specifically, the BVerfG referred to recital (5) of the SSM Regulation to sup-
port its views on competence.217 The first sentence of recital (5) states that
‘[c]ompetence for supervision of individual credit institutions in the Union
remains mostly at national level’. However, upon reflection, it is doubtful that
this recital actually supports the BVerfG’s views on Member State competence.
The recital in question is among a few recitals which essentially present the main
considerations that prompted the Council to adopt the SSM Regulation.218 It is
submitted that the first sentence of recital (5), which the BVerfG highlighted,
refers to the supervisory landscape prior to the establishment of the SSM.219
In other words, all this sentence does is to underscore that hitherto banks were
supervised nationally. It is essentially ‘backward-looking’, not ‘forward-looking’,
and has as such little to offer in order to determine questions of competence
under the SSM Regulation.
To sum up, according to the BVerfG, NCAs, when carrying out their SSM
tasks in relation to ‘less significant’ entities, continue to do so on the basis of pre-
existing (national) competence and not as a result of a redelegation by the ECB
to NCAs. In coming to this conclusion, the BVerfG relied both on Article 127(6)
TFEU and on the SSM Regulation which according to the BVerfG supports a dis-
tribution of competences between the ECB and NCAs. Importantly, the fact that
216 See in this context M Jacob, Precedents and Case-Based Reasoning in the European Court of
Justice: Unfinished Business (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 81 noting that the
Court is ‘quite happy’ to seek support in statements that would be treated as obiter dicta according
to common law doctrines.
217 BVerfG (n 2), para. 192.
218 After the first sentence, rec (5) goes on to say that ‘[c]oordination between supervisors is vital
but the crisis has shown that mere coordination is not enough, in particular in the context of a sin-
gle currency. In order to preserve financial stability in the Union and increase the positive effects of
market integration on growth and welfare, integration of supervisory responsibilities should there-
fore be enhanced. This is particularly important to ensure a smooth and sound overview over an
entire banking group and its overall health and would reduce the risk of different interpretations
and contradictory decisions on the individual entity level’.
219 Note that the sentence in question appears to originate from the Commission Proposal for the
SSM Regulation (COM (2012) 511 final), which further underscores that it refers to the supervis-
ory landscape prior to the establishment of the SSM. See proposed rec (4) which states that
‘[c]ompetence for supervision of individual banks in the Union remains mostly at national level.
This limits the effectiveness of supervision and the ability of supervisors to reach a common under-
standing of the soundness of the banking sector throughout the Union. In order to preserve and in-
crease the positive effects of market integration on growth and welfare, integration of supervisory
responsibilities should therefore be enhanced’. The reference to ‘mostly’ in the first sentence of re-
cital (5) should be seen in light of the establishment of the European System of Financial
Supervision (ESFS) and the European Supervisory Authorities (ESAs), as part of the ESFS, in
2011. Although the European Banking Authority (one of the ESAs) was not vested with day-to-
day supervisory powers, it was given various tasks and powers which are relevant for the supervision
of credit institutions at the national level (promoting convergence, coordination, and cooperation
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the SSM Regulation vested the ECB with an oversight role and with a range of
powers over NCAs, did not warrant a different conclusion. As far as the allocation
of competence over less significant entities is concerned, the BVerfG accordingly
interpreted the rules in a way that is broadly consistent with layering: national
competence is not replaced, but ‘new institutional layers’—in our case an ECB
layer—‘are added to it’.220 As a result, the BVerfG was able to reach an outcome
on competence that markedly contrasted with the findings of the CJEU.
V. Assessing institutional change: from contestation
to reconciliation?
Having examined the decisions of the EU courts and the BVerfG, it is now pos-
sible to pull together the different parts of the argument. In Section III, I began
by examining the changes that the SSM Regulation introduced along three key
institutional dimensions: competence, powers, and governance. Rather than to
insist on a single ‘label’ to describe these changes, I submitted that analytically the
more interesting question concerned the extent to which the changes introduced
by the SSM Regulation were left open to interpretation and therefore open to fu-
ture change and contestation. I zoomed in on the ambiguities affecting the com-
petence dimension—the most important institutional dimension—and
examined the decisions of the CJEU and the BVerfG. I explained how the
BVerfG’s very own interpretation of EU law contrasted with that of the CJEU,
and how as a result the decisions of these courts failed to agree on the scope of
the ECB’s exclusive competence under the SSM Regulation. I described this epi-
sode as one of change and contestation between courts: where the ambiguities
and incompleteness inherent in the SSM rules enabled change to be amplified by
the CJEU and to be contested by the BVerfG, through processes of ‘conversion’. I
showed how in this conceptualization of conversion, conversion and layering
were linked: the outcomes to which ambiguous rules could be directed and redir-
ected (that is, by amplifying legal integration or by affirming national compe-
tence) depended on whether or not, these rules were interpreted in a way that is
consistent with layering. Hence, it was only by tracing change from the point of
the enactment of the law to its interpretation by the courts that it was possible to
gain a real appreciation of the dynamics and salience of change within the SSM.
However, there is more. In the episode that I describe above, attempts at ‘con-
version’ were not only directed at enacted rules. They extended to the interpret-
ation of judicial decisions. Recall that according to the BVerfG, the L-Bank
rulings did not stand in the way of its views on the allocation of competence in
the SSM. As a result, the BVerfG’s judgment was not—for the BVerfG at least—at
220 J van der Heijden, ‘Institutional layering: a review of the use of the concept’ (2011) 31 Politics,
9–18, 11.
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the origin of an open conflict between the German and EU courts. In this way,
the BVerfG’s judgment on the Banking Union is also different to the BVerfG’s de-
cision on the PSPP which I mentioned earlier.221 Recall that in this latter judg-
ment, the BVerfG found that both the ECB and the CJEU had acted ultra vires.
It is common to view this judgment as the first where the BVerfG made good on
its threat to openly oppose the CJEU or, as some commentators have put it, to
not just ‘bark’ at the CJEU but to ‘bite’.222 In contrast, in the Banking Union
judgment, the BVerfG pretended that all was well between courts. However, to
come to this conclusion, the BVerfG read the L-Bank rulings in a way that trivial-
ized their findings on the scope of the ECB’s exclusive competence. The reality is
that in the Banking Union judgment, the BVerfG disputed in a very real sense the
scope of the ECB’s exclusive competence, as ‘discovered’ by the CJEU in its L-
Bank decisions. To use the ‘bark or bite’ metaphor, in the Banking Union judg-
ment, which preceded the BVerfG’s judgment on the PSPP, the BVerfG was not
just ‘all bark and no bite’. It bit; it is just that it pretended not to.223
That being said, I am left in this section with a final point to consider: that is,
the prospect of reconciliation following the decision of the BVerfG on the
Banking Union. Generally speaking, two common mechanisms or strategies can
be envisaged. The first is reconciliation by political agreement. In our context, it
involves resolving ambiguities in the legislative text by way of legislative amend-
ment. The second mechanism is reconciliation by way of judicial ‘agreement’. It
involves the preliminary reference procedure. I will explain why both are prob-
lematic and conclude by examining a third possibility, which I will call ‘unilateral’
reconciliation.
Starting with the strategy of legislative amendment, it is of course true that it is
always open to the Council to amend the SSM Regulation in accordance with
the requirements of Article 127(6) TFEU. Specifically, the Council could decide
to offer clarification on the scope of the ECB’s exclusive competence by amend-
ing the provisions of the SSM Regulation. However, if reconciliation is the aim,
this strategy is an unlikely contender. Seeking clarification would almost certainly
fail the unanimity hurdle of Article 127(6) TFEU. As noted earlier, the question
of who supervises smaller credit institutions was a major issue for Germany dur-
ing the negotiations of the SSM Regulation. As Merino notes:
[i]t is certainly not by coincidence that Germany has been the country that most ac-
tively advocated for decentralisation of supervision, either during the negotiations at
the Maastricht Treaty and at the moment of activating the ECB’s supervision more
than 20 years later.224
221 See text to nn 66–70 above.
222 E.g. See M Maduro, ‘Some preliminary remarks on the PSPP decision of the German
Constitutional Court’ (6 May 2020), available at https://verfassungsblog.de/some-preliminary-
remarks-on-the-pspp-decision-of-the-german-constitutional-court/.
223 For a contrasting view, see Faraguna and Messineo (n 11), 1641.
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By affirming the primary competence of NCAs over less significant entities, the
BVerfG also affirmed the competence of the German financial supervisory au-
thority (BaFin) over numerous smaller German credit institutions.
Unsurprisingly, the decision of the BVerfG was welcomed by the German govern-
ment which also noted in relation to bank supervision that it would continue to
make sure that a significant part of the tasks and responsibilities remained with
NCAs.225 Hence, attempts to clarify the competence provisions of the SSM
Regulation in a way that would benefit the ECB at the expense of NCAs would
almost certainly be vetoed by Germany. Likewise, any amendment that dimin-
ished the role of the ECB would face the unanimity requirement of Article
127(6).
That said, even if salient amendments are likely to fail because of the unanim-
ity hurdle, there are still other ways to make changes – for example, by taking ad-
vantage of the interplay between the SSM Regulation and other legislative acts.
Thus according to Article 1 of the SSM Regulation, institutions referred to in
Article 2(5) of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) are not subject to
supervision by the ECB. It follows that by amending Article 2(5), it is possible to
exclude institutions from the ECB’s supervisory competence. The point is not
just academic. Indeed, it is precisely because of a recent amendment to Article
2(5) that L-Bank is no longer subject to ECB supervision. As Smits put it, in the
end, L-Bank was able to achieve ‘through political means’ what it could not
achieve through judicial means.226
A second strategy is formal judicial dialogue between courts. The formal
method of judicial dialogue is the preliminary reference procedure. Under this
procedure, national courts address questions about the interpretation or the val-
idity of EU law to the CJEU. Gauweiler was the first ever preliminary reference
of the BVerfG to the CJEU.227 The CJEU was asked to decide on the legality of
the ECB’s Outright Monetary Transaction programme which authorized the
225 Deutscher Bundestag, ‘Antwort der Bundesregierung auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten
Christian Dürr, Dr Florian Toncar, Frank Schäffler, weiterer Abgeordneter und der der Fraktion
der FDP’ (Drucksache 19/13215, 13 September 2019), 2, available at <https://dip21.bundestag.
de/dip21/btd/19/132/1913215.pdf> noting that ‘[d]ie Bundesregierung sieht durch diese
Klarstellung auch die Rolle der BaFin und der Bundesbank in der Bankenaufsicht bestätigt und
wird weiter darauf achten, dass ein wesentlicher Teil der Aufgaben und Befugnisse im Bereich der
Bankenaufsicht bei den nationalen Aufsichtsbehörden verbleibt’.
226 R Smits, ‘L-Bank to escape ECB supervision in the end’ (13 June 2019), available at https://
ebi-europa.eu/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/L-Bank-to-escape-ECB-supervision-in-the-end.pdf. I
would like to thank Lukas Simkus for bringing the impact of the CRD on the SSM Regulation to
my attention.
227 Case C-62/14 Gauweiler and others, ECLI:EU:C:2015:400. The literature on Gauweiler is ex-
tensive. See eg T Tridimas and N Xanthoulis, ‘A legal analysis of the Gauweiler case: between mon-
etary policy and constitutional conflict’ (2016) 23 Maastricht Journal of European Comparative
Law, 1–39; P Craig and M Markakis, ‘Gauweiler and the legality of outright monetary transac-
tions’ (2016) 41 European Law Review, 4–24; A Hinarejos, ‘Gauweiler and the Outright Monetary
Transactions Programme: the mandate of the European Central Bank and the changing nature of
Economic and Monetary Union’ (2015) 11 European Constitutional Law Review, 563–76.
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ECB to buy bonds of Eurozone Member States in secondary markets. The case is
well known for its constitutional significance. The case is also known for the fact
that the BVerfG was critical of this programme and outspoken in its order for ref-
erence, suggesting that the only way to save the OMT programme was by insist-
ing on restrictions which, according to Mayer, would have left it ‘crippled and
ineffective’.228 The CJEU upheld the OMT programme in a judgment, which
Tridimas described as a one of ‘institutional empowerment, with the ECB emerg-
ing as the big winner’.229 In the Banking Union judgment, the BVerfG decided
against making a reference to the CJEU.230 Accordingly, the preliminary refer-
ence procedure could never play its role.
However, the absence of a preliminary reference by the BVerfG may not be the
end of the story. Arguably, reconciliation could still occur unilaterally either fol-
lowing a court ruling or because of the way in which the rules are practised. To
start with the former point, the decision by the BVerfG left the CJEU arguably in
a second mover position.231 This raises the question of how the CJEU may re-
spond to the BVerfG’s findings. Admittedly, from an EU law perspective, the
CJEU is the final authority on EU law and the CJEU can, as a matter of law, safe-
ly disregard the BVerfG’s ‘Karlsruhe version’232 of EU law. It is also true that the
CJEU almost never explicitly overrules a previous decision.233 However, this is
not to say that the CJEU does not ‘chip away’ at its case law.234 Nor is it to say
that the CJEU is unaware of the need for collaboration and effective dialogue be-
tween courts.235 That said, whether this type of ‘unilateral’ reconciliation is a real-
istic prospect is entirely unclear.236 It would require an analysis that has more
228 Mayer (n 63), 114.
229 Tridimas (n 89), 32.
230 The absence of a reference to the CJEU has been criticized in the German literature. See
Gentzsch and Brade (n 11), 619.
231 See in this context U Häde, ‘Das Urteil des Bundesverfassungsgerichts zur Bankenunion—
Strategiewechsel in Karlsruhe’ (37. Frankfurter Newsletter zum Recht der Europäischen Union, 12
August 2019), available at <https://www.europa-uni.de/de/forschung/institut/institut_fireu/news
letter/37_-fireu-Newsletter.pdf>.
232 I am borrowing the expression from Mayer (n 64), 1117.
233 Jacob (n 216), 159, noting that ‘[w]hile the ECJ is quite willing to distinguish cases, it is loath
to openly depart from precedents’.
234 Ibid, 127–54, who identifies a number of techniques.
235 Some may disagree with this observation. Dieter Grimm in his comment on the PSPP judg-
ment criticized the CJEU for having largely failed to engage in a sufficient dialogue with its nation-
al counterpart. D Grimm, ‘A long time coming’ (2020) 21 German Law Journal, 944–9, 947.
236 The CJEU certainly continues to refer to its L-Bank findings on competence: see Case C-686/
18 OC e.a. and Others v Banca d’Italia and Others ECLI:EU:C:2020:567, para. 43 finding that
‘Article 6(4) of that [SSM] regulation provides, in essence, the criteria for determining the cases in
which those tasks are to be carried out by the ECB alone and those cases in which the national
competent authorities are to assist the ECB in carrying out those tasks, by a decentralised imple-
mentation of some of those tasks in relation to less significant credit institutions, within the mean-
ing of the first subparagraph of Article 6(4) of that regulation . . .’. See also the legal opinion of AG
Campos Sanchez-Bordona in Case C-219/17 Berlusconi and Fininvest v. Banca d’Italia
ECLI:EU:C:2018:502, para. 104, noting that ‘[t]he SSM is a complex, multi-layered structure
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predictive orientations, which would also require a more thorough assessment of
the judicial behaviour of the CJEU and the BVerfG.237 Suffice to say here that
whatever incentives the CJEU may have had to adopt a conciliatory tone, prima
facie, these incentives are likely to be significantly diminished following the
BVerfG’s PSPP judgment in which the BVerfG did not hold back in its criticism
of the CJEU,238 and ruled that the latter had acted ultra vires.239 Arguably, in the
wake of this decision, the CJEU is more likely than ever to wish to take a stand
and affirm its role as the ultimate authority on European law.240 That said, my
aim here is not to make predictions or advise on what is advisable. It is simply to
note—in broad and general terms—that lack of legal clarity can offer actors
openings to seek reconciliation. Thus, if legal ambiguity or legal ‘gaps’ offer
actors an interpretative space to engage in contests over the meaning, purpose, or
function of rules,241 it prima facie also offers an interpretative space to seek recon-
ciliation. As noted earlier, the L-Bank rulings are not devoid of ambiguity—for
example, think in this context of the meaning of a ‘decentralized implementa-
tion’, a notion that the EU courts in L-Bank largely failed to flesh out.
Last but not least, unilateral reconciliation may prima facie also occur because
of the way in which rules are practised. To be sure, for legal scholarship, the study
of ‘formal institutions’ in the sense of enacted rules is of obvious interest. In this
article, I examined three such formal institutional dimensions: mainly compe-
tence, but also powers and governance. However, it is important to acknowledge
that the way in which such ‘institutions’ are applied in practice can be important
for how we think of change in each dimension. Hence, we must remain alert to
the difference between ‘law in action’ and ‘law on the books’. Thus, even if the
ECB can rely on the authority of L-Bank to insist on its exclusive competence
over the tasks in Article 4(1), the ECB may in practice show greater deference to
operation of the system, and controls the body of tasks required by the mechanism. To achieve
these objectives, the ECB has exclusive powers within the SSM framework. The NCAs’ involve-
ment reflects the logic of the decentralised exercise of these powers, rather than a distribution of
competences between the ECB and the national authorities’ (references omitted).
237 For a game theoretical contribution, see A Dyevre, ‘Domestic judicial defiance in the European
Union: a systemic threat to the authority of EU law’ (2016) 35 YEL, 106–44.
238 See e.g. BVerfG (n 66), para. 116ff.
239 Ibid para. 163.
240 See in this context, Court of Justice of the European Union, ‘Press release following the judg-
ment of the German Constitutional Court of 5 May 2020’ (8 May 2020), available at <https://
curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2020-05/cp200058en.pdf> noting that ‘[i]n
general, it is recalled that the Court of Justice has consistently held that a judgment in which the
Court gives a preliminary ruling is binding on the national court for the purposes of the decision
to be given in the main proceedings. In order to ensure that EU law is applied uniformly, the
Court of Justice alone—which was created for that purpose by the Member States—has jurisdic-
tion to rule that an act of an EU institution is contrary to EU law. Divergences between courts of
the Member States as to the validity of such acts would indeed be liable to place in jeopardy the
unity of the EU legal order and to detract from legal certainty. Like other authorities of the
Member States, national courts are required to ensure that EU law takes full effect. That is the only
way of ensuring the equality of Member States in the Union they created’.
241 See the literature on institutional change in Section II.B above.






/yel/advance-article/doi/10.1093/yel/yeab002/6242767 by guest on 17 June 2021
NCAs when the latter supervise less significant entities. Of course, one could
make a similar point with respect to BaFin, which might in practice act in a way
that acknowledges the ECB’s exclusive competence, notwithstanding the findings
of the BVerfG on primary national competence. As noted earlier, the question of
how rules are practised is one that is best addressed empirically. This leaves open
an important space for future research.
VI. Conclusion
The aim of this article was to engage with the law of the SSM, with a view to con-
tribute to the literature on institutional change. It contended that whilst the SSM
was a story of change following an exogenous shock (ie the sovereign debt crisis),
shedding light on judicial decision-making demonstrated that the SSM was also
an account of change and contestation between courts, made possible by the am-
biguity and incompleteness of the SSM rules. This ambiguity and incomplete-
ness served as an interpretative ‘battle ground’ between courts, and ultimately
enabled change to be amplified or to be contested through processes of rule ‘con-
version’. Hence, it was only by tracing change from the point of the enactment of
the law to its interpretation by the courts that one could gain a real appreciation
of the dynamics and salience of change within the SSM. To carry out the analysis,
this article adopted a cross-disciplinary approach. It drew on literature in political
science in order to gain a better understanding of the mechanics of institutional
change, and adopted a legal lens in order to make sense of the legal intricacies of
the SSM Regulation and the judicial rulings. Finally, this article reflected on the
prospect of reconciliation. It showed why common strategies were out of reach.
However, it did not dismiss the possibility of reconciliation, either because of the
way in which rules are practised or following future judicial rulings. In this latter
context, it stressed that legal ambiguity not only offered an interpretative space
that enabled actors to contest change. Prima facie, it also offered a space that
could enable reconciliation.
Before bringing this article to a close, it is worth repeating that the BVerfG
does not have jurisdiction over an EU institution such as the ECB.
Notwithstanding this, there are arguably good reasons for the ECB not to take a
strictly hierarchical approach in its relations with NCAs when these supervise less
significant entities. The SSM is a complex construct which, to function effective-
ly, requires cooperation between the EU and the national level. This is especially
so in relation to the supervision of less significant entities, where the ECB greatly
depends on NCAs which are on the front line.
Lastly, it is also worth underscoring a final time that from an EU law perspec-
tive, it is the CJEU and not the BVerfG that decides questions about the inter-
pretation and the validity of EU law. Nonetheless, there are reasons to be critical
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especially disappoint. In particular, the BVerfG’s reading of the L-Bank decisions
is open to criticism. Meanwhile, it is unlikely that the GC’s decision will be
remembered as a decision that was well reasoned. As noted, the GC was at times
sloppy (eg with respect to subsidiarity). The gaps and ambiguities in the legal
text offered the court significant leeway. Moreover, in ruling on the annulment
action, the GC’s broad-brush approach with respect to the scope of the ECB’s ex-
clusive competence arguably went beyond what was necessary to decide the case.
The subsequent appeal before the CJ made no difference. None of this can be
said to build trust between courts. And relationships, including relationships be-
tween courts, work better with trust.
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